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ABSTRACT
Extant literature has yet to fully examine the 
antecedents to, and performance implications of, 
horizontal expansion strategies. Defined as strategies 
that increase a firm's domain within an industry, these 
business level strategies constitute an important 
component of a firm's overall scope. This study takes a 
complementary view of two theories of the firm--resource 
theory and governance theory--in order to explain 
horizontal strategy and performance. An empirical 
investigation of 101 restaurant chains shows that firms 
respond to governance cost pressures when choosing among 
alternative horizontal strategies, except when 
strategically valuable resource stocks are low. However, 
no clear link was found between this strategic behavior 
and performance. The interaction between resources and 
governance furnishes a stronger explanation of horizontal 
strategic choice than previous research grounded in either 
theory alone. Furthermore, one-way relationships 
identified by prior research may need to be re-evaluated.
ix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Resource theory (cf. Wernerfelt, 1984) and governance 
theory {cf. Williamson, 1985) are two important theories 
for understanding organizations (e.g., Anderson &
Coughlan, 1987; Barney, 1988; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1992; 
Conner, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Harrigan, 
1988a, Teece, 1980). According to resource theory, 
managers choose among alternative strategies based on the 
need to build strategically valuable resource stocks 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989). strategy, therefore, enables the 
firm to acquire and/or protect the unique and valuable 
resources needed to compete effectively in new markets 
(e.g., Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). According to 
governance theory, managers respond to governance costs 
(Mahoney, 1992) when selecting among alternative 
strategies. Specifically, firms are thought to seek 
strategies that minimize the costs of negotiating and 
enforcing (i.e., governing) transactions across markets 
vis-a-vis internal hierarchies (Williamson, 1975; 1985) . 
Also, the costs of monitoring and bonding agents (e.g., 
managers or cooperative partners), often across 
geographically dispersed operations, gives rise to agency 
costs (another form of governance costs) which the firm 
will wish to minimize in strategic decisions (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, strategies are chosen such that 
transaction and agency governance costs are minimized.
1
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Although these two theories are usually viewed as 
independent or competing (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 1992; 
Conner, 1991), the central assertion of this study is that 
they are better viewed as complementary. That is, firms 
are expected to respond to the "fit" between resource 
stocks and governance costs in their particular context 
(Venkatraman, 1989). Specifically, firms are postulated 
to pay primary attention to governance costs when choosing 
among alternative strategies--except when important 
resource stocks are low. When firms suffer from resource 
shortages, they should respond with strategies designed to 
fill resource gaps. Additionally, when firms respond in 
accordance with these theoretical arguments, they should 
perform better than firms that do not because they will be 
responding effectively to cost pressures (i.e., governance 
costs) and competitive needs (i.e., resource stocks).
This synthesis of resource and governance theory is 
tested in the context of horizontal scope. Although 
extensive literatures investigate strategies for expanding 
vertical and industry (i.e., diversification) dimensions 
of scope, strategic management researchers have not yet 
tested a general model of horizontal (i.e., business 
level) scope. Horizontal scope can be defined as the 
domain or breadth of organizational activities within a 
single industry setting. Thus, horizontal expansion 
strategies are business level strategies that increase the
3
geographic or market segment scope of a firm's operations. 
In light of calls for firms to return to their "knitting" 
(Peters & Waterman, 1962), refocus on "core competencies" 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), or constrain themselves within a 
"dominant logic" (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), a study 
focused on horizontal expansion at the business level 
seems timely.
Although the literature on horizontal expansion is 
fairly fragmented, five major strategies for horizontal 
expansion have been identified. These are; (1) internal 
development, (2) horizontal acquisition/merger, (3) equity 
joint venture (EJV), (4) management contract, and (5)
franchising. With respect to these, two general research 
questions are relevant. First, what are the factors that 
influence managers to select particular horizontal 
expansion strategies? The answer to this question will 
help practitioners better understand the competitive 
pressures acting upon them and enhance their ability to 
predict competitors' strategy. Second, given the field of 
strategic management's concern with performance (e.g., 
Hrebiniak, Joyce, & Snow; 1989; Meyer, 1991), do strategic 
choices among alternative horizontal strategies impact 
performance? These questions furnish the driving force 
behind this study.
4
Statement of the Problem
The need to Investigate a synthesis of resource and 
governance theories in the context of horizontal expansion 
is derived from three sources. First, the two theories 
examined in this study have sometimes been viewed as 
competing explanations of similar phenomena {e.g., Carney 
& Gedajlovic, 1991; Conner, 1991). Multiple and competing 
theories, such as these, must be compared and/or 
integrated if the discipline of strategic management is to 
continue to develop (cf. Kuhn, 1962). Although there have 
been some initial attempts to integrate governance and 
resource theories, these efforts have been, to date, 
incomplete (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs & 
Castrogiovanni, 1994; Castrogiovanni, Bennett, & Combs, 
1995). Hence, there is a need to better understand the 
relationship, if any, between these two theories 
(Bacharach, 1989).
Second, although the concepts of scope and business 
level strategy are central to strategic management (Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978; Schendel & Hofer, 1979), little is known 
about the antecedents to strategy in the context of 
horizontal expansion. Indeed, few studies directly 
address issues of geographic or market segment scope 
(i.e., horizontal scope). There is a large body of 
research to help marketers identify market segments (Beane 
& Ennis, 1987; Biggadike, 1981), and Abell (1980)
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translated some of this literature into terms strategic 
managers could use to define their business domain. 
However, these studies do not shed light on why or how 
firms alter their horizontal scope.
Finally, despite the importance of explaining 
performance, most horizontal scope literature only 
attempts to explain strategy, ignoring how these choices 
might affect the firm's performance. Several studies 
explore the performance implication of a single horizontal 
expansion strategy (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987; Koh & 
Venkatraman, 1991), and a smaller group of studies (e.g., 
Anderson, 1984) investigates the performance implications 
of a dichotomous choice between two strategies. However, 
these studies fail to simultaneously compare the 
performance implications of additional horizontal strategy 
options. This is problematic because extant research does 
not reflect the variety and complexity of horizontal 
strategy alternatives actually confronting managers.
Hence, there is a need to investigate the performance 
implications of the full range of horizontal strategy 
choices.
Significance of the Study
The purpose of this study is to use resource and 
governance theories to better understand the factors that 
influence firms in their selection of horizontal expansion 
strategies and to investigate the performance outcomes of
6
horizontal strategy. As noted, most of the horizontal 
scope literature currently centers on the antecedents to, 
and performance outcomes of, only one or two alternative 
horizontal expansion strategies. By building upon this 
work, a model is set forth that combines resource and 
governance explanations for horizontal strategy across a 
broad range of strategy options. Importantly, the model 
also examines the effect of strategy on performance. 
Through an empirical test of the model, three 
contributions are present.
The study's first contribution is derived from its 
integration of resource and governance theories. Because 
these theories offer conflicting explanations of the same 
phenomena, there is a need to better understand the 
conditions under which managers should respond to the 
prescriptions of each theory. The "fit" between resource 
and governance described in this study begins to explain 
these conditions. Additionally, the interaction found 
here between measures of resource stocks and governance 
costs should encourage future researchers to design more 
inclusive (i.e., both resource and governance) studies and 
provide a caveat to the interpretation of prior research 
that relied on a single theory (i.e., either resource or 
governance).
The study's second contribution is to further our 
understanding of the antecedents to horizontal strategy.
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Such understanding is important because it can help 
managers make more accurate predictions of their 
competitor's strategic behavior. While prior research has 
examined horizontal expansion strategies from a single 
theoretical frame (e.g., Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; 
Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988a), this study provides a 
more powerful model than was previously available by 
suggesting that horizontal strategy is better understood 
by integrating resource and governance theories.
Finally, this study examines the relationship between 
strategy and performance. Most strategic management 
scholars agree that research in the field must ultimately 
be able to inform practitioners and enhance organizational 
effectiveness (Montgomery, Wernerfelt, & Balakrishnan, 
1989; Summer, et al., 1990). However, extant research on 
horizontal strategy has focused little attention on 
performance. For example, investigations of horizontal 
strategy from a governance perspective have concentrated 
solely on predicting governance structures (e.g.,
Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988). Superior 
performance is implied for firms choosing low cost 
governance, but the relationship has not been tested. 
Likewise, a few studies have examined the relationship 
between resource stocks and performance (e.g., Castanias & 
Helfat, 1991; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991), 
but the resource-strategy-performance link remains
8
untested despite its deep roots in the literature (e.g., 
Andrews, 1965).
Summary of Remaining Chapters
This chapter set the stage for the remainder of the 
dissertation by briefly outlining shortcomings in extant 
literature and highlighting potential contributions from a 
study of horizontal strategy, its antecedents, and 
performance. Specifically, this study attempts to 
contribute by,- integrating resource and governance 
theories, (2) enhancing understanding of the motivational 
antecedents to horizontal expansion strategy choice, and
(3) linking strategy and its antecedents to performance in 
the context of horizontal expansion strategies. The 
remainder of this dissertation outlines how these 
contributions are to be achieved.
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) begins with a survey of 
studies which examine the performance implications of 
individual horizontal strategies. The literature 
surrounding each of the five horizontal strategies is 
examined in order to demonstrate the applicability of 
resource and governance theories across the full range of 
horizontal expansion strategies. Then, Chapter 3 (Model 
Development and Hypotheses) develops a model and 
hypotheses depicting horizontal strategy as a function of 
the fit between resource stocks and governance costs.
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Performance is modeled as the fit between all three; 
resource stocks, governance costs, and strategy.
Chapter 4 describes the sample, measures, data 
sources, and statistical tests used to test the 
hypotheses. The results presented in Chapter 5 show a 
clear effect on strategy from the interaction between 
resource stocks and governance costs in sampled firms. 
Firms with fewer strategically valuable resources were 
using resource assuring cooperative strategies despite the 
high costs of governing these arrangements. However, 
performance was not shown to be affected by the three-way 
interaction between resource stocks, governance costs, and 
strategy.
The final chapter (Chapter 6) begins by revisiting 
the study's hypotheses and summarizing the results. The 
implications of significant and non-significant results 
are described. The study's shortcomings are also 
addressed. These limitations, along with the results, 
point to useful avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
A focal contribution of this study, noted in Chapter 
1, is the examination of performance outcomes in the 
context of horizontal expansion. Because research in 
strategic management is ultimately aimed at understanding 
and improving organizational performance, the first 
section of this chapter reviews the studies which have 
examined the relationship between one or more of the 
horizontal expansion strategies and performance. The 
sparseness of these studies and the narrowness of their 
focus highlights the need to simultaneously investigate 
the entire array of horizontal strategies in order to make 
more general statements regarding the relationship between 
different strategies and performance.
The second section reviews five horizontal expansion 
strategy alternatives; (1) internal development, (2) 
horizontal acquisition/merger, (3) equity joint venture,
(4) management contract, and (5) franchising. The purpose 
of this review is to bring to light the theories found in 
extant horizontal scope literature. The two most 
prominent theories, resource and governance, are employed 
in the next chapter to develop a model of horizontal 
strategy and performance.
Horizontal Expansion and Performance
Studies investigating the relationship between an 
individual horizontal expansion strategy and performance,
10
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can be found in the acquisition/merger, equity joint 
venture (EJV), and franchising literatures. Each is 
reviewed below.
Merger and acquisition. The central goal of the 
merger and acquisition literature has been to understand 
how acquisition benefits, if any, are distributed among 
stockholders (Lubatkin, 1983). Much of this research 
emerges from finance using the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). It is an attempt to investigate the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions on shareholder wealth (Lubatkin & 
Shrieves, 1986). Reviews of this literature generally 
conclude that target firms' shareholders enjoy abnormal 
returns (the difference between actual and expected stock 
returns) while shareholders of acquiring firms do not 
(Halpern, 1983; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Likewise, the few 
studies that employ accounting measures of performance, 
although plagued with methodological difficulties, 
generally demonstrate limited significant performance 
benefits for acquiring firms (Love & Scouller, 1990). 
Similar results appear when divestment records are used as 
a measure of acquisition success (e.g., Porter, 1987). 
Hence, the empirical evidence in favor of merger and 
acquisition strategies is less than compelling, especially 
for acquiring firms.
In response, strategic management scholars have 
employed the notion of ’'fit” as an explanation for the
12
poor results emanating from studies using the CAPM. They 
suggest that sample aggregation may hide differences in 
the organ!zationa1 or strategic fit between combined firms 
{Lubatkin, 1983; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Proper 
"fit" then, may give rise to performance rewards for 
acquiring firms. Studies of organizational fit generally 
confirm improved performance from combining firms that 
share a dominant logic (i.e., similar competitive, 
structural, and technological characteristics--Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986). Surveys collected by Datta (1991) showed 
that similarity of management styles can moderate the 
performance of acquisitions. Similarly, Chatterjee, 
Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Heber (1992) found evidence that 
cultural fit also moderates stock performance for 
acquiring firms. Likewise, the studies of strategic fit 
have found performance differences between acquisition 
types. Specifically, horizontal and unrelated mergers 
have, for different reasons, been related to above normal 
stock returns (Chatterjee, 1990; Lubatkin, 1987; Kitching, 
1967). However, like the finance literature, the 
strategic fit studies find that profits generally go to 
the target firm's shareholders (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987; 
Shelton, 1908; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Taken as a 
whole, this research suggests that horizontal acquisitions 
may have better performance implications than other types 
of acquisitions. Considering the complexity of the
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acquisition process (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986}, in addition 
to the problems of merging cultures and organizational 
systems (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh. 1988), horizontal 
acquisitions furnish most of the sought-after advantages 
of acquisitions (cf. Goold & Luchs, 1993), but at lower 
integration costs stemming from greater isomorphism 
between the merging firms (cf. Jones & Hill, 1988).
Several implications can be drawn from this stream of 
research for the present study. First, as a stand alone 
strategy, acquisitions have not been shown to produce 
significant, above normal returns for acquiring 
businesses. However, while these studies only explore 
short-term stock performance, any real benefits from 
acquisition strategies are most likely long-term in 
nature. Further, successful acquisitions often involve 
synergistic resource combinations that cannot be detected 
by market observers (Barney, 1988) . Second, results 
improve when merging firms share the same dominant logic. 
Hence, there is reason to believe that horizontal 
acquisitions, which should involve similar ways of 
conducting business, perform better than other types of 
acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986). Finally, no studies to 
date examine the performance outcomes of acquisition 
relative to other means of horizontal expansion.
Eouitv joint venture. Joint ventures are 
organizations, called the "child," created and owned by
14
two separate organizations, or "parents" (e.g., Harrigan, 
1968b). Equity joint ventures (EJVs) involve a sharing of 
equity, usually equal, among the parents. Although they 
are usually viewed as the most complex and interdependent 
form of cooperation between otherwise independent firms 
(Contractor & Lorange, 1988), the weight of evidence shows 
that their use is increasing dramatically (Hergert & 
Morris, 1988). The studies that have looked at EJV 
performance have viewed it as a function of (l) industry 
structure, (2) EJV strategy, or (3) control. First, 
depending on industry structure, joint venture's vary 
significantly in duration (sometimes used as a proxy for 
performance). Embryonic industries are often 
characterized by a "spider's web" of different forms of 
cooperative arrangements that service temporary strategic 
needs, capitalize on narrow windows of opportunity, and 
reduce investment risk in the face of significant 
uncertainty (Harrigan, 1988a). In contrast, declining 
industries often use more long-term EJVs to retire excess 
capacity and reduce competitive rivalry (Harrigan, 1988b). 
Recent scholars have, however, questioned the use of 
stability and longevity as an indicator of EJV success 
(Hamel, 1991).
Others view EJV stability and success in relation to 
the strategic purposes for which an EJV was initiated.
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) examined the strategy-
15
performance link among 175 joint ventures in the 
information technology sector. They found greater stock 
returns resulted from EJVs active in the parents' existing 
product and/or market segments. These results suggest 
that when EJVs are formed to combine resources 
synergistically, investors expect superior performance 
(e.g., Woolridge & Snow, 1990).
Finally, some observers see control as the central 
feature in EJV success. In an international context, 
Geringer & Herbert (1989) posit joint venture performance 
as a function of the fit between parents' international 
strategy, EJV strategy, and control. They explicitly look 
at three dimensions of control. Mechanisms for control 
include majority ownership, veto rights, supplying general 
management, and organizational routines and procedures 
(Behrman, 1970; stopford & Hells, 1972). Because 
transaction costs can be minimized (Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986), some evidence suggests that superior EJV 
performance results when one partner dominates, or 
maintains the full extent of control (Killing, 1983). 
Finally they argue that control can be centered or focused 
on a narrow band of organizational activities. Given 
international strategy and context, these three control 
dimensions should be configured to maintain sufficient 
control over key inputs while minimizing monitoring,
16
negotiating, and bonding costs between parents 
(Williamson, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976}.
Although elements of industry structure, EJV 
strategy, and control have been shown to impact the 
performance of EJVs, prior research provides no evidence 
suggesting the context in which they should be used 
instead of alternative strategies. The fact that EJVs are 
increasingly popular indicates that they must have some 
perceived advantages over other strategies. These 
advantages are, however, yet to be investigated.
Franchising. This "hybrid" form of organization can 
be defined as a continuing relationship in which the owner 
of a service or trademark grants exclusive rights to a 
franchisee for local distribution in exchange for certain 
fees, royalties, and compliance to service standards 
(Justis & Judd, 1989} . In addition, the franchisor 
(service owner} usually provides business training and 
advice. In the literature on franchising, only Anderson 
(1964) tests the performance outcomes of franchising. He 
was, however, unable to demonstrate any definitive 
performance effects. Unfortunately, his unit of analysis 
was the industry and his measure of performance, sales per 
establishment, fails to account for variance in cost 
structure. Hence, it is impossible to draw conclusions 
that would be useful to firms who must choose among 
alternative growth strategies.
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In aggregate, studies that examine the relationship 
between a horizontal strategy and performance suffer from 
several deficiencies. First, the acquisition and EJV 
studies are troublesome because their samples mix several 
forms of diversification with horizontal expansion. For 
example, Lubatkin (1987) studies concentric, conglomerate, 
and vertical acquisitions in addition to horizontal. It 
is therefore difficult to isolate the performance 
implications of the horizontal component of strategy. 
Second, extant work does not explore performance 
implications across the full range of horizontal strategy 
options. The literature may tell us that EJVs can be 
effective in a particular context, but it sheds little 
light on its effectiveness relative to other options. 
Finally, with the exception of qualitative evaluations of 
EJV success, most of these studies are unable to find any 
support for positive performance effects when a strategy 
is investigated in isolation. Therefore, a comparison of 
the antecedents of alternative strategies and their 
performance implications may help alleviate this problem 
(Williamson, 1991).
Strategies for Horizontal Expansion
In order to establish a framework in which to compare 
horizontal strategies and their performance outcomes, the 
five strategies for horizontal expansion are reviewed 
below. Special care is taken to identify the theoretical
is
rationale observers have used to explain why, and under 
what conditions, managers select each of the strategies. 
These theoretical perspectives are summarized in Table 2-
1. As shown in the table, only governance and resource 
approaches to explaining horizontal strategy span the 
whole range of strategic options. These theories can 
therefore provide the foundation of a model explaining 
strategy and performance.
Internal development. Firms that grow through 
internal development use internally generated funds and 
debt to build and manage new operations (Sasser, Olsen, & 
Wyckoff, 1978). This strategy provides the most control 
of any horizontal strategy over expanding operations, but 
at the expense of growth, which is restricted by current 
earnings and debt capacity (Ansoff, 1965; Martin & Justis, 
1993). Currently, not much literature relates directly to 
internal development. Much of what does exist resides in 
the context of internal resource allocation processes. 
Bower's (1970) study of internal allocation processes 
describes how lower level resource shortages often dictate 
strategic behavior in large diversified firms. Also, 
Burgleman (1983; 1984) shows how internal venturing finds 
space in corporate strategy.
Recent work using a resource based theory of 
organization (e.g., Conner, 1991) may help explain when
19
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internal development may be an appropriate strategy. 
According to this theory, only firms possessing 
strategically valuable resources (those that are important 
in competition and difficult to imitate--Lippman & Rumelt, 
1962) can create a sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) 
(Barney, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Often the 
characteristics of resources that can support a SCA (e.g., 
Barney, 1991) are such that they require long-term 
investments (Barney, 1986). These resources (e.g., 
trademarks, business systems, reputation, and employment 
practices) can often be shared and strategically combined 
via cooperative strategies (e.g., Harrigan, 1988a), but 
they are difficult to purchase without paying a premium 
(Barney, 1968). Internal development also furnishes a 
mechanism by which these resources can be protected once 
built (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) .
Research comparing internal development to 
acquisitions in the context of diversification entry 
strategy also sheds light on why internal development may 
be selected. Yip (1982) examined 59 market entries and 
found some evidence that internal diversification was 
associated with strategic relatedness and low entry 
barriers. Chatterjee (1990) explored 144 diversification 
moves at 47 Fortune 500 firms and found that internal 
diversification is preferred over acquisition when 
internal funds are widely available and the expansion is
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highly related to existing businesses. Taken together, 
these studies indicate internal development is favored 
among resource abundant firms when market entry is highly 
related, as it often is with horizontal expansion.
Governance costs provide another explanation for the 
choice of internal development. Due to potential shirking 
(i.e., opportunism) and high coordination costs, 
transaction cost logic states that firms choose to 
internalize those activities which are costly to perform 
through intermediaries (Williamson, 1975). Likewise, 
agency theory specifies internal development when the 
costs of monitoring managers' behavior within the 
hierarchy can be done at lower costs than through 
cooperative alternatives (Eisenhardt, 1989a).
In summary, although internal development can be 
viewed as a response to internal strategic processes 
(e.g., Bower, 1970; Burgleman, 1983; 1984), it can be more 
appropriately described as a strategy to create and 
protect resource stocks. Resources that must be built 
over a long time period can be protected through the high 
level of control inherent in internal development 
(Chatterjee, 1990; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). In addition, 
internal development appears to be a tool to minimize 
governance costs (Table 2-1) . Therefore, we would expect 
internal development to be used predominately in
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situations where firms have the financial resources to 
implement it, and where effective control is essential.
Horizontal accruisition/merger. Evidence on why firms 
choose acquisition as a strategy to expand horizontally 
comes first from studies that asked managers directly why 
they employ acquisitions. Baker, et al. (1981) identified 
fifteen separate motives for acquisitions. Their analysis 
of differences in motives between managers involved with 
different acquisition types found that horizontal mergers 
were motivated more by the desire to obtain economies of 
scale, increased market share, and expansion of geographic 
scope than were other types of acquisitions. Similarly, 
Walter and Barney (1990) identified twenty motives for 
acquisitions. Their analysis of merger and acquisition 
specialists' opinions of manager motives showed horizontal 
acquisitions to be motivated by the desire to enter new 
businesses, improve economies of scale and scope, increase 
product lines, and to manage critical dependencies. Taken 
together, these studies suggest that increased economies 
of scale and scope (i.e., economic efficiency) is a 
central explanation for why managers engage in horizontal 
acquisitions and mergers.
Certainly, one of the more conventional explanations 
for horizontal acquisitions is to increase market power 
(Jensen & Ruback, 1983). As the number of firms in the 
industry decrease through horizontal acquisition, tacit
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collusion by the remaining firms is thought to become 
increasingly feasible (Stigler, 1964). However, if market 
power was driving horizontal acquisitions then rival 
firm's performance would be expected to improve on the 
news that they could collude more easily and this does not 
appear to be the case (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983).
Hence, other forces besides market power appear to be 
driving horizontal acquisitions.
From the research on the acquisition-performance 
relationship reviewed previously, another reason firms 
employ horizontal acquisitions is evident. Several of the 
studies suggested that acquisitions are a superior 
strategy when resources are combined in ways that build 
upon a dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Some 
research shows these advantages are most likely available 
in horizontal acquisition, suggesting that another 
potential motive for horizontal acquisition is to build 
strategically valuable resource stocks by combining 
compatible resources (Barney, 1988; Chatterjee, 1986) .
In summary, the most clear motives for horizontal 
acquisitions are increased economies of scale and scope, 
increased market power, and resource accumulation (Table
2-1). It should be noted, however, that these are highly 
related motives. Often, it is valuable and unique 
resource combinations that lead to economies of scope and
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market power, and hence, to a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1969).
Eoultv joint venture. Kogut (1988) identifies three 
central motives for joint venture formation; (1) learning, 
(2) improving strategic position, and (3) minimizing 
transaction costs. Organizational learning is clearly a 
primary goal for many EJV parents who enter a joint 
venture for the expressed purpose of learning an important 
skill from a partner, especially in technologically 
complex industries (Killing, 1983). Stated differently, 
when firms' lack critical resources (such as skills), 
joint ventures enable them to tap into another's resource 
base to perform market functions that could not be 
achieved independently (Hamel, 1991).
Joint ventures are also used to enhance a firm's 
competitive position vis-a-vis competitors. Previous 
research offers several important competitive and 
strategic uses for EJVs. For example, they can be used to 
influence an industry's competitive structure by 
increasing concentration levels, controlling unpredictable 
competitors, or by increasing the speed of industry 
evolution (Harrigan, 1988a). Not only can EJVs be 
employed to increase market power and erect entry 
barriers, they can also be used to by-pass such barriers 
(Vickers, 1985). Additionally, EJVs can be used to gain a
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"toe-hold" in strategically important markets, or to 
capture first mover advantages (Harrigan, 1986a).
The third explanation of EJV formation is provided by 
transaction costs. Hennart (1988) argues that 
organizational learning and strategic positioning are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions to explain why 
firms choose EJVs over other strategic options. In the 
transaction cost logic of institutional economics, EJVs 
represent a hybrid form of organization (Williamson,
1985). Firms would rather invest equity in an operation 
in order to have direct control as well as to avoid costly 
negotiations and inefficient monitoring of cooperative 
partners (Williamson, 1975). Indeed, several studies 
associate EJVs with these incentives (Hennart, 1988;
Kogut, 1988). Although transaction cost economics can 
explain why firms want some form of equity arrangement 
over arms-length negotiations, in order to explain EJV 
formation it must also explain why firms do not choose 
complete ownership (Hennart, 1988). Hence, from a 
transaction costs (or more generally, governance ) 
perspective, firms that choose an EJV, must also face 
significant costs, risks, or structural impediments to 
deter the firm from complete internalization (Buckley & 
Casson, 1988; Hennart, 1988).
In sum, EJVs come about as a result of a myriad 
factors (Table 2-1) . First, they can be used to combine
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complementary skills (resources) in order to Increase 
organizational learning and build resource stocks.
Second, they appear to be tools for strategic positioning. 
For instance, they can be used to enhance market power or 
to maneuver around entry barriers. Finally, they can be 
used to create a hybrid form of organization that balances 
the costs of governance and the advantages of direct 
control.
Management contract. These represent contractual 
arrangements where a firm takes an active role in the 
management of facilities owned by another organization. 
Often these operations are housed within a larger 
institutional environment (e.g., fast food restaurants on 
college campuses). In theory, they have been placed on a 
continuum of control (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) or of 
interorganizational dependence (Contractor & Lorange,
1988) between equity joint ventures and franchising. 
Relative to EJVs there is a loss of control because the 
host organization can cancel the contract if disagreements 
arise in the relationship (cf. Harrigan, 1988b).
Similarly, without shared equity to bind cooperating 
firms, participants in management contracts can experience 
increased interorganizational dependence. Although it has 
not been empirically validated, the logic of management 
contracts as a choice along a control or dependence 
continuum is consistent with the logic of efficiency in
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governance (Williamson, 1991) . Hence, the only extant 
explanation for management contracts views them as a 
mechanism for balancing governance costs with control 
needs (Table 2-1), However, the nature of this balance 
remains unspecified.
Franchising. In terms of horizontal scope, 
franchising permits expansion to a critical mass by 
accessing financial and local management resources (Caves 
& Murphy, 1976; Oxenfeldt fit Kelly, 1969). However costs 
associated with franchising include the risk of free 
riding behavior by franchisees, under-investment in system 
development by local entrepreneurs, and expensive contract 
negotiations (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & 
Castrogiovanni, 1994}. Nevertheless, franchising is used 
in a plethora of industries and it has spawned significant 
research interest. As detailed below, much of this work 
centers on the question of why firms choose a particular 
mix of franchised and internally developed outlets. 
Scholars have usually adopted either a resource or 
governance position when investigating this question.
Resource arguments are based on a life-cycle logic 
(e.g., Levitt, 1965) which suggests that young firms 
lacking the necessary financial and managerial resources 
to obtain economies of scale engage in franchising as a 
mechanism to acquire these scarce resources. As a firm 
matures, it builds slack resources and competencies which
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permit it to reduce its dependency on franchising and fund 
future growth through internal development (Carney & 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969).
Several empirical studies provide support for 
resource theory. At the industry level, some evidence 
shows falling rates of franchising as the firms in an 
industry mature (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Hunt, 1973). At 
the firm level, older and larger franchisors have been 
found to shift their system composition away from 
franchising as resources accumulate in maturity (Combs & 
Castrogiovanni, 1994; Hunt, 1973). Moreover, increased 
franchising has been linked with periods of economic 
recession when credit (i.e., a key financial resource) is 
tighter (Martin & Justis, 1993).
The second viewpoint on franchising builds on agency 
theory as articulated by Jensen & Meckling (1976) . It 
states that franchising facilitates growth by allowing 
firms to expand into regions that would be costly to 
manage with internal company managers. More important 
than growth per se. however, is the cost reducing function 
that franchising in certain locations can provide for the 
franchisor. Hence, there is an assumed need for economic 
efficiency in the control function (Carney fit Gedajlovic, 
1991). According to the agency perspective, franchisors 
are believed to balance the costs associated with 
monitoring internal company managers against franchising's
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liabilities (i.e., free riding behavior, negotiation 
costs, and risks of franchisee under-investment).
There is substantial evidence to support an agency 
theory explanation of franchisor behavior. Geographic 
dispersion, which increases the costs of monitoring 
company managers, is associated with increased franchising 
(Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Norton, 1988b). Also, 
locations close to headquarters (i.e., low costs of 
monitoring company managers) and those with low repeat 
business (i.e., high risk of franchisee free riding 
because customer dissatisfaction manifests elsewhere in 
the firm's system) tend to be company owned (Brickley & 
Dark, 1987) . Finally, Caves and Murphy (1976), and others 
(Brickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991; Norton, 1988b) found 
higher use of company ownership in transient industries 
where free riding behavior would be expected (because the 
customer is not coming back to that outlet).
Together, theories suggest that franchising has two 
central motivations (Table 2-1). First, it can be a 
mechanism for growth, furnishing scarce financial and 
managerial resources when they are insufficient. Second, 
it can be used in combination with internal development to 




This chapter began by reviewing studies that 
investigate the relationship between individual horizontal 
strategies and performance. In general, these studies 
fail to; (1) separate diversification strategies from 
horizontal strategies, (2) compare performance effects of 
alternative horizontal strategies, and (3) identify 
significant stand alone performance effects among the 
horizontal strategies studied. The second section 
reviewed the five horizontal strategies: (1) internal 
development, (2) horizontal acquisition, (3) EJV, (4) 
management contract, and (5) franchising. The review 
pointed to two dominant theoretical perspectives, resource 
and governance, which can together be used to explain all 
five horizontal strategies. In the next chapter, these 
theories are combined in order to provide an explanation 
for horizontal strategy across the entire range of 
alternatives.
CHAPTER 3: MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
The last chapter identified two theories that have 
been central to explaining how managers are influenced to 
select among alternative horizonal strategies. The 
sporadic nature of testing for performance implications 
across these strategies was also noted. In this chapter, 
these two theories, resource and governance, are 
integrated into a model suggesting that the "fit” between 
resource stocks and governance costs will influence 
strategy. It is then posited that when managers choose 
strategy commensurate with theoretical predictions, 
superior performance should follow.
In the first section of this chapter, the two 
theoretical explanations of horizontal strategy are 
outlined. Next, the horizontal strategies reviewed in 
Chapter 2 are placed conceptually on a continuum in order 
to facilitate the integration of resource and governance 
theories across the five strategies. In the third 
section, a model is presented depicting the fit between 
governance costs and resource stocks as influencing 
strategy along the continuum, and the fit between 
governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy as 
affecting financial performance.
Theories of Horizontal Expansion Strategy
Prom the review of horizontal strategy summarized in 
Table 2-1, two general theories for explaining horizontal
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strategy choice are apparent--(1) resource and (2) 
governance. Because they have been used independently 
across all of the horizontal expansion strategies, they 
provide the groundwork for an integrated theory of 
horizontal strategy and performance. These theories are, 
therefore, briefly outlined below.
Resource. In his seminal work that laid the 
foundation for business-level strategic analysis, Andrews 
(1965) painted a fairly balanced picture of how both 
internal and external factors contribute to successful 
strategies. However, only in the last decade have 
researchers re-examined the role of heterogeneous 
distributions of resources in shaping strategy and 
performance. Resource based theory of strategy emphasizes 
how managers act to acquire resources that will build a 
sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) for the firm 
(Conner, 1991). Much of the research using this approach 
attempts to describe the characteristics of resources that 
will, over time, build a SCA. Barney (1991) asserted that 
resources must be: (1) strategically valuable such that 
they are necessary to implement strategy, (2) rare enough 
that not many competitors can possess them, (3) 
imperfectly imitable, meaning others cannot create the 
resource without significantly higher costs, and (4) non- 
aubatltutable (i.e., other resources cannot produce the 
same benefits). Others have articulated similar lists of
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resource characteristics (e.g., Grant, 1991). Some of the 
specific resources that have been named as potential 
providers of a SCA include management teamwork (Castanias 
& Helfat, 1991; Hambrick, 1987), culture (Barney, 1986), 
brand name capital (Aaker, 1991), and internal development 
processes (Burgleman, 1983).
Also central to a resource based theory is the notion 
that some firms are able to control strategically valuable 
resources that other firms cannot or will not duplicate 
(Barney, 1991). Historical investment patterns and 
significant environmental shiftb have been named as the 
two primary factors giving rise to resource based 
advantages. For example, a steady pattern of investment 
over time can build resources such as brand name 
reputation, employee commitment, or effective top 
management team interaction (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
Significant environmental disruptions (i.e., technological 
shifts) can leave a previously dominant firm struggling 
with competitors who were fortunate enough to possess 
matching resources (e.g., the "correct" technology)
(Barney, 1986; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Even capital 
resources, which are often thought to flow efficiently 
between organizations, can be difficult for otherwise 
successful firms to obtain (Martin & Justis, 1993) .
Hence, to maximize chances for success in the market, 
firms should identify what types of resources are
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necessary to compete in their industry, employ strategies 
designed to build resource stocks as quickly as possible, 
and protect those resource stocks once they are built.
Governance. Transaction cost economics and agency 
theory constitute the two major, and highly related, 
governance theories of firm behavior. Transaction costs 
theory asserts that firms choose strategy and structure so 
that organizational activities are performed in the least 
cost environment--hierarchy or market (i.e., whether to 
internalize a function or contract for it with an external 
actor) (Williamson, 1975). Transaction cost economics can 
trace its roots to Coase (1937). By recognizing the costs 
inherent in using markets to perform transactions, Coase 
hypothesized that firms will grow until the marginal costs 
of organizing equals the marginal costs of contracting in 
markets. Borrowing heavily from Coase, Williamson (1975) 
extended the framework and articulated market and 
transaction specific variables which may influence firms' 
choice between hierarchy and market. As two firms become 
interdependent with one another (i.e., through 
contracting), each increases its exposure to potential 
opportunistic (i.e., shirking) behavior on the part of the 
other firm. Risk of opportunism then, becomes an 
incentive for each firm to internalize the activities 
previously performed by the other (Williamson, 1975) .
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The second governance theory, agency, is focused on 
the relationship between principal(s) and their agent(s)—  
to whom some decision making authority is delegated 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency 
theory was developed independently of transaction costs by 
economists in the 1960s and 1970s who were concerned with 
how groups could be efficiently monitored given group 
members' incentive to shirk (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz,
1972). Because principals and agents are assumed to have 
divergent self-interests, the central premise of agency 
theory states that they will minimize; (1) the principal's 
costs of monitoring the agent's actions, (2) any costs 
paid by the agent to ensure the principal's interests 
(i.e., bonding costs), and (3) any residual loss due to 
remaining divergence between their respective goals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Although the two theories do not share the same 
academic legacy, they are remarkably similar as depicted 
in Table 3-1. Both theories possess an efficiency 
orientation that offers guidance for selecting between 
alternative governance arrangements. Moreover, they share 
many of the same assumptions and their lists of governance 
costs overlap (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Mahoney, 1992) .
One important difference is that they employ 
different independent variables (i.e., measures of 
governance costs; Eisenhardt, 1989a). However, Mahoney
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1 This Table draws heavily from Eisenhardt (1989a), 
Mahoney (1992), and Williamson (1975; 1985).
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(1992) points out that by including both ex ante 
information search and negotiation costs, as well as ex 
post monitoring, bonding, and adaptation costs, 
transaction costs simply encompasses a broader array of 
governance costs into its framework than does agency. 
Hence, agency costs can be viewed as a sub-set of 
transaction costs. A second salient difference is found 
in their respective focus. Because transaction costs are 
found on the organization's boundary, it tends to explore 
questions such as: Can this type of business use joint 
ventures (e.g., Hennart, 1988)? Agency, on the other 
hand, highlights internal relationships. Hence, it asks 
questions such as: Given that franchising is appropriate 
for our business, in what locations should it be used 
(e.g., Lafontaine, 1992)? The distinction is important 
because it explains why most horizontal strategy 
literature centers on transaction costs while the 
franchising literature employs an agency framework.
Although there are still some meaningful theoretical 
differences between transaction and agency approaches to 
governance, for three reasons this study focuses on their 
common governance costs explanation for strategy. First, 
they share the same basic central hypothesis. Namely, 
hierarchies can furnish better control over behavior, 
while markets can provide stronger incentives to 
organizational actors and greater strategic flexibility
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(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Second, both perspectives are used 
in extant horizontal strategy literature (Table 2-1). 
Perhaps more importantly, both are necessary to fully 
explain strategy across the whole range of horizontal 
alternatives. Finally, there has been a subtle shift in 
the literature toward an overall emphasis on governance 
(e.g., Hennart & Park, 1994; Mahoney, 1992).
In summary, resource and governance theories are 
independent theories which specify alternative 
explanations of strategy. Resource theory views strategy 
as the way a firm builds and manages its base of valuable 
resources. Conversely, governance theory depicts strategy 
as a way to minimize the costs of doing business. In 
order to combine these theories in the context of 
horizontal scope, the next section places the strategies 
for horizontal expansion on a continuum and relates the 
continuum to resource and governance.
A Continuum of Horizontal Strategy
The five horizontal strategies reviewed in the last 
chapter can be placed on a continuum as shown in Table 3-
2. The shaded top box displays the five horizontal 
expansion strategies to be investigated. The next five 
boxes indicate the underlying dimensions, and breadth, of 
strategy continua used elsewhere. In strategies toward 
the left, firms act more unilaterally, thus they are 
labeled independent strategies while strategies to the
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Table 3-2: A continuum of horizontal expansion strategies
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[---------(Erramilli fc Rao, 1990)---------- ]_____
Differences in purpose, boundary, value creation, & 
stability
[■ (Borys & Jemison, 1989) ]
1 Borys and Jemison's (1989) framework employs the 
broadest definition of hybrid organizational forms. Hence, 
it is the only one that explicitly includes acquisition.
2 The abbreviations are: l) ID-internal development, 2) 
HA-horizontal acquisition, 3) EJV-equity joint venture, 4) 
MC-management contract, and 5) Fran.-Franchising.
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right are called cooperative strategies (Contractor & 
Lorange, 1988).
As the Table (3-2) shows, this ordering of strategy 
is consistent with extant literature. Furthermore, it 
reflects both resource and governance theories. Resource 
theory posits that firms engage in strategies to build and 
protect strategically valuable resources (Conner, 1991). 
Although independent strategies such as internal 
development and horizontal acquisition can certainly build 
resources, they do so as a higher cost than cooperative 
strategies (Harrigan, 1988a). Resources must be purchased 
at, or above, market prices in the case of horizontal 
acquisitions (Barney, 1988) and managers who choose 
internal development face greater capital constraints 
(Martin & Justis, 1993). Moreover, firms using internal 
development often experience increased market exposure 
because it forces managers to emphasize some resources 
over others before their future value is known (Barney,
1986). Nevertheless, independent strategies can protect 
valuable resources by giving the firm full hierarchical 
control (Geringer & Herbert, 1989). Conversely, 
cooperative strategies (i.e., EJVs, management contracts, 
and franchising) furnish increased opportunities to build 
on the resources of other firms (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). 
This, however, is at the expense of increasing levels of 
interorganizational dependence (Contractor & Lorange,
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1988). Further, cooperative strategies furnish fewer 
effective mechanisms to maintain control over these 
resources {Geringer & Herbert, 1989).
Governance theories also posit stronger control over 
organizational activities in independent strategies 
because of the direct control mechanisms built into 
hierarchies (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Williamson, 1991) .
Internal development is placed somewhat higher on the 
continuum because it renders greater control than 
horizontal acquisitions due to the complexity inherent in 
merging firms (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Shrivastava, 1986). 
However, the benefits of control must be balanced against 
the bureaucratic costs that can breed inefficiency and 
inflexibility under these strategies (Jones & Hill, 1988; 
Merton, 1945). Moving toward cooperative strategies, 
strategic flexibility will often increase, but at the cost 
of fewer effective control mechanisms (Anderson, & 
Gatignon, 1986; Borys & Jemison, 1989; Williamson, 1991). 
Hence, the continuum presented in Table 3-2 is meaningful 
for both resource and governance theories of strategy and 
it is consistent with extant literature.
A Model of Horizontal Expansion Strategy
Although other theoretical perspectives have been 
employed in horizontal expansion studies, resource and 
governance were shown to be useful theories across all of 
the identified strategies. Moreover, resource and
43
governance have been presented as competing explanations 
of horizontal strategy. A central thesis of this 
dissertation is that our understanding of horizontal 
strategy and its relationship to performance can be better 
understood through an integrated model of horizontal 
strategy (cf. Combs & Castrogiovanni( 1994). Therefore, a 
model is presented in Figure 3-1 where strategy is seen as 
being influenced by the fit between resource stocks and 
governance costs. If firms make choices that "fit" the 
theoretical logic, they should perform better in 
subsequent years than firms that fail to conform to the 
model.
Hypotheses
Much of the logic for the model comes from the 
resource scarcity thesis, which posits that when a 
resource is central to competitive success in an industry 
(see: De Vasconcellos & Hambrick, 1989), firms lacking 
that resource will engage in strategies designed to obtain 
it--even in the face of high governance costs (Carney & 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Conversely, 
when firms possess adequate resource stocks, their 
strategic choices will reflect minimization of governance 
costs (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Hence, the nature of 
the relationship between resource stocks and governance 
costs is such that resource stocks moderate the governance 
cost-strategy relationship (cf. Venkatraman, 1989).
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This logic requires that two relationships be specified. 
First, high governance costs (i.e., high external agent 
negotiation and monitoring costs) should lead to more 
independent strategies (strategies to the left of the 
continuum: Table 3-2) and low governance costs should 
relate to cooperative strategies (on the right of the 
continuum). This relationship is well established in the 
governance literature (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Williamson,
1991). Second, when resources are insufficient, 
cooperative strategies, which furnish access to another 
firm's resources, will be chosen regardless of governance 
costs. Hence, governance costs will only influence 
strategy when resources are adequate. Resource stocks are 
expected to influence the relationship between governance 
costs and strategy only when resource stocks are low.
Thus, it is expected that;
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant interaction
between resource stocks and governance 
costs such that when resource stocks are 
low, firms will select cooperative 
strategies. When resource stocks are high, 
firms will respond to governance costs such 
that high governance costs will lead to 
independent strategies and low governance 
costs will lead to cooperative strategies.
This hypothesis is displayed visually in Figure 3-2 
as a contrast between the shaded and unshaded cells.
The other interaction set forth in the model (Figure
3-1) is between resource stocks, governance costs, 
















Figure 3-2: Hypothesized interaction between resource 
stocks and governance costs: Effect on 
strategy
stocks, governance costs, and strategy will impact 
performance is based in part on the logic of efficiency 
which underlies the transaction cost and agency approaches 
to governance (Williamson, 1985). Although it has never 
been empirically validated, this literature assumes that 
by responding to governance cost pressures, firms are 
selecting low cost alternatives (Williamson, 1985). 
Presumably, choosing the "correct" (i.e., low cost) 
strategy translates into better performance. Likewise, 
resource theory views cooperative strategies as a resource 
saving and resource combining strategy that can be used to 
build competitive advantage and superior performance. 
Therefore, for those firms that respond appropriately to 
simultaneous pressures for efficiency and resource 
accumulation, superior performance can be expected.
Stated as a formal prediction:
Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant three way
interaction effect between resource stocks, 
governance costs, and strategy such that;
(a) firms that choose cooperative strategies 
when resource stocks are low regardless of 
governance costs or when governance costs are 
low regardless of resource stocks,
and;
(b) firms that choose independent strategies 
only when resource stocks and governance costs 
are high;
will perform better in subsequent time periods 
than those that do not.
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Figure 3-3 visually displays this hypothesis such 
that the shaded cells (representing firms expected to be 
high performers) are contrasted with the unshaded 
(expected low performers).
Sumnary
This chapter began by describing the two theoretical 
explanations (resource and governance) of horizontal 
strategy choice. Then a continuum of horizontal 
strategies was outlined to facilitate the development of 
an integrative model of strategy and performance. This 
model, set out in the third section, shows resource stocks 
and governance costs interacting to influence strategic 
choice. The fit between resource stocks, governance 
costs, and strategy is then expected to affect 
performance. The final section articulated two hypotheses 
depicting the specific nature of the expected "fit" or 
interaction between resource stocks and governance costs 
on strategy (Hypothesis 1}, and the impact of the 
interaction between resource stocks, governance costs, and 
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Figure 3-3: Hypothesized interaction between governance 
costs, resource stocks, and strategy: Effect 
on performance
CHAPTER 4: METHOD
In this chapter, the procedures for testing the 
hypotheses are set forth. The sample and data sources are 
discussed first, followed by a description of measures 
used in the analysis. Finally, the procedures used to 
develop scales, establish reliability and validity, and 
test the hypotheses are described.
Sample and Data Sources
Sample. Although environmental contingency factors 
are beyond the scope of this study, they contribute to 
variance in strategy (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990), and 
must therefore be controlled. One effective means of 
controlling for such factors is to choose a sample from 
within a single industry setting. The food service 
industry (denoted as standard industrial classification 
[SIC] 5812 by the U.S. Department of Commerce) was 
selected because; (l) this industry is one of the few that 
uses all horizontal strategies, (2) there is a large 
enough population of public firtnB from which to compose an 
adequate sample, and (3) appropriate measures can be found 
for all modeled constructs.
The years 1988 through 1993 were selected because 
they are the most recent years in which data are 
available. 1988 was chosen as the starting point because, 
according to Standard and Poor's Industry Survey, it 
marked a point of departure for several trends that have
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dramatically affected the industry's growth. These 
trends--(1) the increase of women in the work-force, (2) 
two income households, and (3) low birth rates--had fueled 
7-15 percent industry growth since the early 1970s. These 
rates of growth leveled off in the late eighties as 
competition from microwavable packaged foods and increased 
birth rates (i.e., families staying home to eat) marked 
slower industry growth. These changes appear to have 
forced the industry into a period of more moderate growth 
with rates dropping from 7 percent in 1988 to 5.9 in 1989 
and tapering off between 3.2 and 4.6 percent during the 
remainder of the study period. By beginning data 
collection in 1988, the results are not greatly confounded 
by any industry-wide structural shift.
Because this is a longitudinal study, the final 
sample must contain firms that were publicly-held for at 
least three consecutive years during this period (1988- 
1993) . Furthermore, firms that do not constitute a chain 
(at least four outlets, see: Hawes & Crittenden, 1984), 
franchisees (e.g., of franchisors such as McDonald's or 
Wendy's), and firm's whose only food service is a 
component of a larger operation (e.g., hotels and casinos) 
were excluded. According to Compact Disclosure, a 
complete database of financial information for all public 
companies, 98 firms meet this criteria. Seven firms were 
later excluded when no experts could be found to rate
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these firms during the expert panel phase of data 
collection (discussed below).
Some of the food service companies in the sample 
engaged in multi-chaining. That is, they owned more than 
one chain of restaurants. For service businesses like 
restaurants, developing a second or third chain cannot 
simply be viewed as the addition of a new product. Unlike 
manufacturing operations, restaurants cannot decouple 
production and distribution (Sasser, et al., 1978) and 
therefore multiple chains cannot share most physical 
resources. Hence, multi-chaining is more analogous to 
related diversification than to product development 
(Carman & Langeard, 1980). For this reason, Rumelt's 
cutoff points of 95 percent of sales for single business 
and 70 percent of sales for dominant business firms were 
applied in the analysis. If the firm obtained, on 
average, less than five percent of its revenues from 
secondary chains, these were excluded from all analyses. 
Otherwise, multiple chains were treated separately for the 
purposes of testing hypothesis 1. This added ten chains 
to the sample, bringing the total to 101 chains.
The performance measures needed to test hypothesis 2 
had to be available at the chain level. For several 
reasons, this stipulation forced a reduction in sample 
size for this hypothesis. First, only firms with a 
dominate chain (70% of corporate sales) could be included
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in the analysis for hypothesis 2. Although chain-level 
scores for some multi-chain firms (i.e., firms without a 
dominant chain) could be averaged when their chains were 
(1) in the same market segment (e.g., Popeye's fried 
chicken and Church's fried chicken) and (2) within one 
standard deviation of one another on all chain-level 
measures used in the study, the remaining multi-chain 
firms were dropped from the analysis. Second, in some 
years firms had to be dropped because they had not yet 
gone public, or because they were taken off the stock 
exchange due to bankruptcy, acquisition, or leveraged 
buyout. Finally, several firms were not traded publicly 
and had to be dropped from the market return component of 
the testing for hypothesis 2. The final sample sizes for 
each year of analysis for each hypothesis is shown in 
Table 4-1*.
Given an average sample size of 85.2 and the 
estimated effect sizes reported in the next chapter (i.e., 
the 2-way interaction effect reported in Table 5-6), this 
sample provided estimated power of beta - .94 to test 
hypothesis l. This level of power exceeds generally 
accepted standards for power (i.e., beta * .8; Cohen,
1977) and surpasses power levels found in prior strategic 
management research (i.e., beta - .59; Mazen, Hemmasi, &
*To preserve some lag between independent variables 
and strategy, independent variables for 1993 data are not 
included in the analysis.
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Lewis, 1987) . However, given the nature of hypothesis 2 
(3-way interaction) and the reduced sample sizes for this 
hypothesis, average power estimates are beta- .44 and .41 
(based on the 3-way interact effects reported in Tables 5- 
14 and 5-15) for market and accounting returns 
respectively (cf. Cohen, 1977). Although these are not 
desirable power levels, as shown in Chapter 5 (Figures 5-6 
and 5-7), low power did not affect the study's findings.
Data sources. Most measures were obtained from 
archival data sources. Financial data was taken from the 
Compact Disclosure database and most of the remaining 
variables were coded from company annual reports, 10-Ks, 
and proxy statements. The advantages of these data 
sources are that they are unobtrusive (Webb & Weick, 1979) 
and provide objective measures validated in prior research 
(e.g., Carney &. Gedajlovic, 1991; Lafontaine, 1992;
Rumelt, 1974). In addition, three constructs for which 
there are no quality archival measures available were 
assessed through an expert panel survey of hospitality 
management educators. In similar research contexts, 
expert opinions furnished by relevant academics have been 
shown to be an effective and valid measure of subjective 
constructs (Chen, Farh, & MacMillan, 1993).
Measures
In addition to the constructs defined in Chapter 3, 
two control variables were necessary to properly test the
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model. These are described first, followed by independent 
and dependent measures. Tables 4-2 through 4-5 and 4-7 
list all of the variable names, their measures, and data 
sources for each construct in the study.
Control variables. Several studies employ measures 
of size and age to measure resource availability {e.g., 
Brickley & Dark, 1987; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991) . Their 
logic, centered in the life-cycle concept (e.g., Levitt, 
1965), is that resources tend to grow as firms mature 
(Combe & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). 
Since resource stocks are measured directly in this study, 
the potentially confounding effects of the life-cycle 
needed to be controlled. Two frequently used measures 
(Scott, 1987) were employed here to assess corporate size: 
total sales and total assets. The number of outlets 
comprising the firm's chain(s) was used as a measure of 
size at the business level (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 
1991; Lafontaine, 1992). Age was measured as the number 
of years since the firm began food service operations 
(AGE). These are shown in Table 4-2.
Governance costs. Governance costs cannot be 
measured directly because they are caused by many 
different factors at multiple levels of the organization 
making them difficult to isolate (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Mahoney, 1992). However, the organizational factors that 
induce governance costs are readily observable (e.g.,
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Table 4-1: Sample sizes for hypothesis testing
Year of independent variables 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Hypothesis 1: 67 77 94 96 92
Hypothesis 2:
Market returns 36 4 5 4 8 55 68
Accounting returns 52 64 77 81 80
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Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1965). Because the 
hypotheses state that the amount of governance costs, not 
the type of governance costs, will interact with resource 
stocks to affect strategy and performance, the sum of 
measures for three types of governance costs are employed 
in this study. These are summarized in Table 4-3.
Measures of geographic dispersion (DISPERSE) are 
commonly used in the franchising literature as a proxy for 
governance costs (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987; Carney & 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs a Castrogiovanni, 1994). As firms 
expand geographically, the governance costs associated 
with monitoring outside agents decreases relative to the 
cost of maintaining a hierarchical structure across 
geographic regions. Moreover, local preferences create 
information asymmetries, which further decrease agent 
governance costs (Rubin, 1978) . The number of states and 
the number of foreign countries with outlets were used as 
measures of geographic dispersion because of their common 
use in the literature (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987, 
Lafontaine, 1992).
Task programmability (TP) is well established in the 
agency literature as central to governance costs 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Mahoney, 1992). It can be defined as 
the "degree to which appropriate behavior by the agent can 
be specified in advance" (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 62}. Task 
programmability, reduces governance costs because it
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allows agent behaviors to be more easily pre-specified.
In this study, we are primarily interested in the 
programmability of the managers' job. In general, simpler 
operations such as "drive-thru-only" fast food restaurants 
should be high on task programmability because day-to-day 
operations can be easily specified in an operations 
manual. This variable was assessed by expert panel 
judgments of task programmability for each chain in the 
sample.
Asset specificity (AS) is central to the transaction 
cost conceptualization of governance (Williamson, 1975). 
Asset specificity can be defined as the "degree to which 
an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value" 
(Williamson, 1991, p. 281). Asset specificity lowers the 
governance coBts of using cooperative agents. When 
cooperative agents make investments in specific assets, 
which cannot be used for other purposes, they have an 
incentive to manage these assets in accordance with the 
wishes of their partner (i.e., the principal), who has the 
power to cancel the cooperative agreement, hence reducing 
the value of specific investments. This bonding 
characteristic of specific assets is what reduces 
governance costs (Klein & Murphy, 1986) . Asset 
specificity was also assessed with the expert panel 
survey.
56
Resource stocks. The hypotheses state that the 
amount. or total stock, of strategically valuable 
resources will interact with governance costs to influence 
strategy and performance. However, there are several 
types of strategically valuable resources that, in 
combination, make-up firms' total resource stocks. This 
study employed measures for three types of resources 
{financial, managerial, and brand name) previously 
identified as strategically valuable to the food service 
industry (e.g., Aaker, 1991; Justis & Judd, 1989; 
Luxenberg, 1985). These measures are shown in Table 4-4.
The first type of resource is financial. To the 
extent that capital markets are efficient, firms with the 
greatest business opportunities should attract the most 
capital and at favorable rates (cf. Fama, Fisher, Jensen,
& Roll, 1969}. Thus, financial resources are seldom 
considered valuable and rare in their capacity to support 
a sustainable competitive advantage (Rubin, 1978) .
However, in the franchising literature, capital scarcity 
has been named repeatedly by franchising practitioners as 
a central reason for using this strategy (Justis & Judd, 
1989; Luxenberg, 1985). Indeed, empirical evidence 
indicates that changes in the availability of funds in 
capital markets influence strategic behavior (Martin & 
Justis, 1993).
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Table 4-3: Governance costs--Constructs, measures, and 
data sources
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Measures of financial resources (FIN) termed "slack" 
have been proposed by Bourgeois (1981). Conceptually, 
measures of slack depict the amount (stock) of financial 
resources which have been amassed over time for potential 
immediate {unabsorbed slack) or relatively short-term 
(absorbed slack) use (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Singh,
1986) . For this study, one measure of "unabsorbed" and 
one measure of "absorbed" slack were used. The construct 
validity of each has been demonstrated in previous studies 
(e.g., Chakravarthy 1986; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). 
Unabsorbed slack was measured by the extent to which cash 
and marketable securities exceed current liabilities, 
adjusted by sales (cash & marketable securities - current 
liabilities / sales). This measure represents highly 
liquid financial assets not yet subsumed into current 
operations. Absorbed slack is a financial resource that 
is more difficult to convert into strategic investments, 
but much of it can nevertheless be made available for 
strategic investment through tighter capital utilization 
practices (Singh, 1986). It is measured as working 
capital (current assets - current liabilities) as a 
percent of sales.
Brand name reputation (BRAND) and top management 
executive experience (TMT) are two other resources 
frequently named as fundamental to success in food service 
(Aaker, 1991; Luxenberg, 1985; Norton, 1988a). Because
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restaurants are an experiential good {Holmstrom, 1985; 
Nayyar, 1993), customers often make first time purchase 
decisions based on brand name reputations (Aaker, 1991). 
Thus, the brand name reputation of a food service 
operation is said to be central to its long term success 
and growth (Luxenberg, 1985). Because no "objective" 
measure of brand name has been established in the 
literature, it was measured through the expert panel.
Research has demonstrated the important role of top 
management team personality and demographic 
characteristics (e.g., Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992) for a number of strategic outcomes, 
including performance (e.g., Murray, 1989). Although no 
consensus has been reached as to which executives to 
include in the operationalization of top management team 
characteristics, one popular approach has been to define 
top management teams by including only inside directors 
(i.e., top management team members with a seat on the 
board of directors--e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). 
This approach has the advantage of providing a clear 
demarcation between top tier and second tier managers. 
Furthermore, directorships indicate membership in the 
dominant coalition (Thompson, 1967) and these managers 
have been shown to possess greater organizational power 
(Finkelstein, 1992).
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Since the objectives of this study were to measure
the total stock of top management team resources available
to the firm, it was measured by the number of years of
executive level food service experience and tenure held by
inside directors. Because the food service industry is
relatively stable, deep knowledge of successful
operational practices and the idiosyncratic
characteristics of a specific restaurant concept is
essential to good organizational performance (Luxenberg,
1965) . Thus, executive experience and tenure are
considered valuable assets because executives with deep
roots in the industry and firm are best suited to develop
and manage the tight operational procedures necessary to
build and maintain consistent service standards and cost
controls, which provide the foundation for long term 
2success.
Strategy. The strategy measure must accomplish two 
tasks. First, it must capture the independentness or 
cooperativeness of strategy as defined by the horizontal 
strategy continuum (Table 3-2) . Second, it needs to 
reflect the pattern of strategy that firms used in 
response to resource and governance conditions during the 
study period (Mintzberg, 1967) . Hence, as shown in Table
4-5, strategy was measured as the percent of growth
2The reverse is true in turbulent industry 
environments (see: Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).
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accomplished through cooperative strategies (i.e., joint 
ventures, management contracts, and franchising) during a 
three year period.^
The measurement period was chosen for three reasons. 
First, because many chains can implement horizontal 
strategy decisions (i.e., build restaurants) in less than 
a year (e.g., McDonald's can build a free-standing unit in 
less than six weeks), the strategy measure begins in the 
same year dependent variables (resource stocks and 
governance costs) are measured. Secondly, a three year 
measurement period was selected because it is consistent 
with strategic planning and implementation time-frames 
discussed in many companies' annual reports or 10-Ks. 
Moreover, this measurement period is long enough to 
provide stability to the strategy measure. If a shorter 
period had been selected, the measure for smaller 
companies' that grow by only one or two restaurants each 
year would be biased in the direction of the strategy 
selected for that year, irrespective of the firm's overall 
strategic direction. For example, Benihana's owned 20 of 
their 23 restaurants (i.e., 67 percent of their 
restaurants were maintained through independent 
strategies) at the end of 1993 and their annual report 
stated their intention to continue to focus on growth
^Because 1994 strategy data was not available, for 
the 1992 independent variables (Model #5 in Table 4-6) 
strategy was only measured with two years of data.
64
through internal development. However, two of their 
cooperatively built restaurants were the only growth they 
experienced during two of the study years (1989 and 1993) . 
Therefore, with an annualized strategy measure, Benihana 
would have skipped from highly independent to highly 
cooperative, depending on the study year in question. 
Finally, the three year measure is an improvement on 
studies that have measured strategy as a percent of growth 
over firms' life spans (e.g., Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; 
Lafontaine, 1992) because that measure confounds five, 
ten, or even twenty year-old changes in strategic 
direction by aggregating strategy over time (e.g., Combs & 
Castrogiovanni, 1994). For clarity, Table 4-6 shows the 
measurement periods for strategy in relation to 
independent variables.
Performance. The most complex concept in this study 
is its ultimate criterion, performance. A great deal has 
been written about measuring organizational effectiveness 
(e.g., Cameron, 1986; Cameron & Whetten, 1983; 
Chakravarthy, 1986) and its central sub-set, financial 
performance (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1966). Much of this 
literature focuses on the multi-dimensionality of the 
performance concept. Indeed, performance can be viewed as 
containing multiple constructs within its conceptual 
domain (cf. Bacharach, 1989). The general consensus is
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Table 4-5: Horizontal strategy--Variable name, measure and 
data source
m & m mm aoHRcn
Strategy Percent of cooperative 10-Ks and
(STRAT) strategies used over three Annual reports
years.
Table 4-6: Time periods for strategy measurements












that multiple performance constructs should be examined 
using multiple measures whenever possible to minimize 
contamination and deficiency (Cameron, 1986; Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1986).
Accordingly, this study viewed performance from both 
an efficiency and a market perspective. These measures 
are summarized in Table 4-7. Accounting based measures, 
such as return on investment (ROI), return on assets 
(ROA), and return on sales (ROS) measure efficiency in 
financial resource usage (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992). 
Because line-of-business data in 10-Ks do not report 
invested capital by line-of-business, ROS and ROA were 
used as efficiency based measures of performance. These 
measures have been used often in strategic management 
research (e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Hill et. al., 1992).
In contrast to the efficiency dimension, measures of 
the market component of performance are "fully specified," 
meaning they reflect the judgements of many "experts" as 
to the risk adjusted current and future earning potential 
of each firm (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986). Based on prior 
research in strategic management (Hitt & Ireland, 1985), 
the Treynor Index (Treynor, 1965; 1968) was used as 
follows:
MR - (MR-l - RFR)/fi
where;
MR » market return;
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Table 4-7: Performance variables--Constructs, variables, 
measures, and data sources
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1 Earnings before interest and taxes.
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MR^ ■ the stock return for firm i adjusted for stock
splits, stock issues and dividends.
RFR - the average risk-free rate based on monthly
average selling prices for the 3-month treasury 
bill auction as reported in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin;
fi - beta, a measure of systematic risk as reported in
Standard & Poor's Company Profiles or calculated 
using the same formula4.
Because this measure captures performance at the 
corporate level, following the standards set by Rumelt 
(1974), only single and dominant chain firms (i.e., those 
with over 70% of their revenues derived from a single 
chain) could be included in this part of the analysis.
Since strategy is an independent variable for the 
second hypothesis, the performance measures needed to 
correspond appropriately with strategy's measurement 
period. Comments by CEOs in annual reports show clearly 
that new outlets usually impact revenues immediately and 
profits within a year after opening. Therefore, 
performance was averaged for the last two years of each 
strategy measurement as shown in Table 4-8.
4Standard fc Poor's Company Profiles only reports 
betas for firms that have been public for 60 months and 
are listed on the American or NASDAQ stock exchanges. 
Therefore, for remaining sample firms whose betas were not 
reported, monthly returns were gathered for study months 
in which the firm was public and betas were calculated 
from this data.
€9
Data Coding and Scaling
The process of coding and calculating scales for this 
study took place in three phases; (1) coding archival 
variables, (2) conducting the expert panel survey, and (3) 
calculating unit weighted scales.
Archival variables. Because Compact Disclosure uses 
a standardized format for reporting financial information, 
the data necessary to calculate financial variables (i.e., 
total sales, total assets, ROS, ROA, absorbed slack, and 
unabsorbed slack) were gathered from this database. The 
data for strategy (STRAT) and geographic dispersion 
(DISPERSE) measures were coded by examining text and 
tables in companies' annual reports or 10-Ks. Years of 
top management team tenure and executive level food 
service experience (TMT) were coded from proxy statements 
and 10-Ks. Although companies reported this information 
in a variety of formats, all information was reported. As 
others have found, the coding procedures were straight 
forward due to the objective nature of the data (Michel & 
Hambrlck, 1992).
Expert panel. Brand name reputation (BRAND), task 
programmability (TP), and asset specificity (AS) were 
assessed through an expert panel questionnaire (see: De 
Vasconcellos & Hambrlck, 1989 for similar methodology).
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Table 4-8: Time periods for strategy measurements
Model 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1) Ind.1
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1 Ind.-1ndependent variab1e s.
2 MR-market returns.
3 AR-Average accounting returns.
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To develop the questionnaire, an initial pool of potential 
questions were generated by three strategic management 
researchers. Content validity of the questions was 
assessed through a retranslation exercise (Smith &
Kendall, 1963) in which ten additional strategic 
management researchers were each given the questions on 
separate slips of paper. Using construct definitions 
taken from the literature, they were then asked to group 
the questions according to the appropriate construct.
Only questions that were categorized with 100% accuracy 
were placed in a pilot questionnaire. Pour questions were 
selected to measure each construct. It was felt that four 
questions was enough to establish reliability while 
keeping the questionnaire to a reasonable length 
(Sheatsley, 19B3).
To pilot test the instrument, fifteen food service 
executives and hospitality academics (from Cuco's Mexican 
Restaurant, Smoothie King, the University of Nevada at Las 
Vegas, and the University of Central Florida) were asked 
to rate 40 chains on the 12 items (4 per construct) using 
7 point Likert scales. From their written comments and a 
factor analysis of the results, one question was replaced 
and several others were re-worded. It also became 
apparent that it would be too much to ask any one expert 
rater to rate more than 10 firms.
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Next, 400 hospitality management educators teaching 
at two and four year institutions were identified through 
the Council for Hotel, Restaurant, and Institutional 
Educators (CHRIE). Because each expert would only be 
asked to rate 10 chains in the sample, the chains were 
broken into ten groups according to the geographic 
location of their headquarters. These were then matched 
with 40 hospitality experts who were located in the same 
region of the country.
The surveys and associated materials (i.e., cover 
letters and follow-up mailings) were constructed and 
distributed in concordance with Dillman's (1978) total 
design method. Through a series of four dozen surveys, 
Dillman and his associates developed specific, 
empirically-supported recommendations designed to maximize 
the response rate from potential informants.
The surveys were sent to potential expert panel 
participants on February 6, 1995, followed by a reminder 
post-card in one week. A second survey was mailed two 
weeks after the post-card and a third survey was sent in a 
final follow-up four weeks later. An example of one of 
the regional surveys is found in the Appendix.
226 surveys were returned, yielding a response rate 
of 55%. However, 44 experts did not rate any of the 
companies listed in their survey because their area of 
expertise was in a narrow sub-field of hospitality (e.g.,
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hotel accounting, nutrition) and they did not feel 
qualified to assess the chains. This left a usable 
response rate of 45.5%, which is significantly higher than
most research in strategic management (Snow & Thomas,
1994). On average, the expert raters were knowledgeable 
about 5.4 chains in their survey (they were asked to rate 
only those chains for which they felt comfortable making 
an expert judgement). As a result, seven chains were 
rated by only one expert. These ratings, however, were 
very consistent with ratings for other chains in the same 
market segment and, thus, were used in the analysis. The
average number of ratings for a chain was 9.3 with a 
standard deviation of 6.1.
Construct validity was assessed through factor 
analysis of the total set of ratings produced by the 
experts (n«983). The Harris-Kaiser oblique rotation was 
used because, unlike orthogonal rotations, it does not 
force factors to be uncorrelated. To assume no 
correlation between factors is usually a poor assumption 
in social science research (Kerlinger, 1986) and if, by 
chance, the factors were uncorrelated in this case, the 
Harris-Kaiser rotation would still have produced 
orthogonal factors. Three factors were selected using the 
eigenvalue greater than one criterion (Kerlinger, 1986).
As shown in Table 4-8, the factor loadings are very clean 
and as expected. Average loadings for variables on their
74
Table 4-8: Expert panel rotated factor pattern
Item BRAND AS TP
BN1 .93* - .12 .03
BN3 .90* .00 .10
BN4 .78* .04 - .11
BN2 .76* .09 - .04
AS 2 - .11 .83* .02
AS1 .07 .73* - .12
AS 3 - .10 .70* .15
AS4 .20 . 61* - .07
TP1 .02 - .09 . 91*
TP2 .03 - .08 .86*
TP4 - .08 .09 .85*
TPS .07 . 10 .84*
Eigenvalue 3.83 2.56 1.76
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theoretically correct factor was .81 while the average 
loading on other factors was, in contrast, only .08.
Thus, the questionnaire shows strong evidence that it is 
measuring three distinct constructs: (1) Brand name 
reputation (BN), (2) asset specificity (AS), and (3) task
programmability (TP).
Two reliability coefficients were calculated to 
establish the instrument's reliability. Cronbach's alpha 
is .87, .86, and .85, for brand name reputation (BRAND), 
task programmability (TP), and asset specificity (AS) 
respectably. These reliability coefficients are above 
traditional standards for basic research in the social 
sciences (Nunnally, 1978). Average inter-rater 
reliability was .81. Thus, the questionnaire appears to 
exceed established reliability and validity standards 
(e.g., Kerlinger, 1986; Nunnally, 1978).
Scales. The reliability and support for the validity 
of measures for task programmability (TP), asset 
specificity (AS), and brand name reputation (BRAND) were 
demonstrated above. Without any theoretical justification 
for another weighing scheme, items that loaded on the same 
factor were summed into unit weighted scales (Nunnally, 
1978).
Zn addition to the expert panel scales, one dimension 
of governance costs (geographic dispersion) and two 
dimensions of resource stocks (financial and top
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management team) have multiple measures. In order to 
assess the construct validity of these measures, they were 
entered into an obliquely rotated factor analysis for each 
year of data (1988-92). As shown in Table 4-9, these 
measures loaded cleanly on independent factors as 
expected. The average loading for items on their 
theoretically correct factor was .84 while the average 
magnitude of loadings on other factors, in contrast, was 
only .07. Hence, these measures appear to tap into three 
independent constructs. These measures were then summed 
to create a single variable for each construct (i.e., 
geographic dispersion, financial resources, and top 
management team experience).
Since the hypotheses are based on the quantity of 
resource stocks and governance costs, it was necessary to 
standardize and then sum the scales for each dimension of 
governance costs (DISPERSE+TP+AS-GOV) and resource stocks 
(FIN+TMT+BRAND*RES). These unit weighted scales were the 
independent measures used in hypothesis testing.
Univariate analysis of variable distributions showed 
that the three size measures (total sales, total assets, 
and number of outlets) were all non-normal. In fact, 
measures of organization size often have logarithmic 
distributions (Scott, 1987) that must be transformed in 
order to meet regression analysis' normality assumption 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992) . Although























































Eigenvalue 2.00 1.46 . 93
193 Q
DISPERSE________ EIH__________ XMX
Countries .80* - .11 .09
States .73* .07 - . 11
Executive experience - .18 .83* - .01
Executive tenure .26 .69* .03
Absorbed slack .05 - .02 .96*
Unabsorbed slack - .05 .02 .95*





Executive experience .88* - .18 .03
Executive tenure .73* .27 - .04
Countries - .09 .78* .00
States .04 .75* .01
Unabsorbed slack .01 - .04 .97*
Absorbed slack -.01 .05 .97*




Executive experience .88* - .17 .04
Executive tenure . 76* .24 -.05
Countries -.09 .79* . 03
States .06 .75* - . 02
Absorbed slack -.01 .01 . 94*
Unabsorbed slack .02 - .00 . 93*
Eigenvalue 1.80 1.68 . 93
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transformation affects the interpretation of a variable's 
coefficient {Hair et al., 1992), the effect will not be 
meaningful here because, as a control variable, size will 
not be interpreted. Hence, the three measures for size 
were transformed by their natural log, standardized, and 
summed into a single scale (SIZE).
One additional multi-measure construct had to be 
summed into a unit weighted scale. The efficiency 
dimension of organization performance was composed of two 
measures of accounting returns. ROS and ROA were 
therefore summed as a measure of efficiency (accounting 
returns: AR).
Data Analysis
Statistical tests for the hypotheses must be capable 
of detecting the presence of interactions. The two-way 
interaction and three-way interaction from Hypothesis 1 
and 2 were pictured in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 respectively. 
Moderated multiple regression {MMR) is generally 
considered the most powerful technique for detecting an 
interaction (Stone, 1988) and with two dependent measures 
(Hypothesis 2), multivariate moderated multiple regression 
(MMMR) is appropriate (Johnson & Wichern, 1988). However, 
as shown by Bobko (1986), in the case of a priori ordinal 
interaction hypotheses like those postulated here, 
traditional regression tests for interaction consumes 
degrees of freedom and leads to unnecessary power loss
80
when a simple t-test between group means (i.e., the shaded 
versus non-shaded cells in Figures 2-2 and 3-3) is 
appropriate. Unfortunately, Bobko's example relies on 
nominal data explored through sub-group analysis. Because 
this study employs interval scales, splitting the variable 
distributions into groups would result in information 
loss. Hence, there is a dilemma because the literature 
does not provide guidance for testing a priori ordinal 
interaction hypotheses with interval data.
To resolve this issue, MMR (Hypothesis 1) and MMMR 
(Hypothesis 2) were used as an initial test of the 
hypothesized moderator effect. Then, sub-group analysis 
was performed by splitting the variable distributions at 
their mean.
Hypothesis 1 was first tested using MMR, repeating 
the following equation for each study year (1988-1992) :
STRAT - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES.
Because these analyses identified an interaction, it was 
necessary to insure that its nature was consistent with 
hypothesis l. Therefore, firms were placed into two 
groups (GROUP); (1) those with higher than average 
resource stocks and higher than average governance costs 
(independent strategists according to hypothesis 1) and 
(2) those with other resource stock-governance cost 
combinations (cooperative strategists according to
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hypothesis 1). Hypothesis 1 was then re-tested using 
ANCOVA with the following model:
STRAT - SIZE, AGE, GROUP.
In order to test the second hypothesis, all 
remaining two-way interactions were added as control 
variables into the following multivariate equation, which 
was then tested for each study year (1988-1992) :
AR, MR - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV, 
STRAT*RES, STRAT*RES*GOV.
Unfortunately, as shown in Table 4-1, the multi­
variate analysis for hypothesis 2 caused severe 
attenuation of n-size due to missing market return (MR) 
data. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was also tested using 
univariate MMR for each dependent variable:
AR - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV,
STRAT*RES, STRAT*RES *GOV;
and
MR - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV, 
STRAT*RES, STRAT*RES*GOV.
As noted sub-group analysis is appropriate when an 
ordinal interaction is specified a priori (Bobko, 1986) . 
Therefore, firms were placed into groups (GROUP) as shown 
in Figure 3-3 by dividing measures for resource stocks, 
governance costs, and strategy at their mean.5 The
5This analysis was also performed with "high" and 
■Ilow" groups defined by STRAT plus or minus one standard 
deviation from its RES*GOV condition group mean. However,
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following MANCOVA model was tested for each year study 
year.
MR, AR - SIZE, AGE, GROUP.
Sumuy
This chapter outlined the sample, measures, and 
hypothesis tests used in this study. The sample was 
selected from all public companies who list SIC 5812 as 
their primary or secondary code. Next, multiple measures 
for each construct in the study and their data sources 
were described. An attempt was made to validate these 
measures based on an appeal to a priori theory, prior use 
in the literature, and through empirical tools such as 
factor analysis. Where possible, reliability was 
demonstrated through appropriate reliability coefficients. 
Finally, procedures were then presented by which the 
hypotheses were tested (moderated multiple regression 
[MMR], analysis of covariance [ANCOVA], multivariate 
moderated multiple regression [MMMR], and multivariate 
analysis of covariance [MANCOVA]).
these results were the same as when all variables were 
partitioned at the mean.
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
Correlations between all independent and dependent 
measures used to create composite scales for hypothesis 
testing are shown in Tables 5-1 through 5-5. Correlations 
between all of the composite scales used in hypothesis 
testing follow in Tables 5-6 through 5-10.6 The 
remainder of the chapter reports the findings for 
hypothesis 1 and 2.
Hypothesis l
The first hypothesis specifies an effect on strategy
from the ordinal interaction between the costs of
governing cooperative agents and the level of resource
stocks available to a chain. Repeated formally:
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant interaction
between resource stocks and governance 
costs such that when resource stocks are 
low, firms will select cooperative 
strategies. When resource Btocks are high, 
firms will respond to governance costs such 
that high governance costs will lead to 
independent strategies and low governance 
costs will lead to cooperative strategies.
Hypothesis 1 was tested first using MMR. These 
results are shown in Table 5-11 where a significant 
interaction term {GOV*RES) indicates support for the 
hypothesis. Since the interaction between resource stocks 
and governance costs is significant at p < .01 in one year
®The correlations between composite scales shown in 
Tables 5-6 through 5-10 are created by summing standardized 
measures. Therefore, means and standard deviations are not 
reported because they are meaningless (i.e., have a mean of 
0 and a standard deviation of 1).
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Table 5-1: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1968 (n-67)
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) TOTAL SALES1 902.604 2466.819
2) TOTAL ASSETS 772.747 2294.616 .97**
3) # OF OUTLETS 685.32 1784.10 .69** _ _ * *.78
4) AGE 18.00 15 .86 - . 09 - .08 .11
5) UNABSORBED SLACK - .09 .15 - .25 - .21 -.18 - .02
6) ABSORBED SLACK - .01 .16 - .14 - .12 - .16 -.09 .88
7) TMT EXPERIENCE 30.42 21.52 -.19 - .18 - .09 *. 39 .01
8) TMT TENURE 31.38 35 .41 _ _ * .22 . 27 .21* . 38 - .18
1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000).
(table con'd)
a>
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9) BRAND NAME 10.77 3 .89 .11 .15 .12 -.06 .07 .04 .08 .16
10) ASSET SPEC. 15.06 4.00 - .01 .06 .16 .00 .08 .05 -.12 - .10
11) TASK PROGRAM 13.67 3.65 .07 .07 .12 .12 .05 - .04 .05 .09
12) # OP STATES 15.91 14.53 .52** .54** .65** .23* - . 39 -.32** - .05 .34
13) # OF COUNTRIES 4.13 9.94 .71** .00** .80** .02 - .15 - .10 - .14 .21
14) STRATEGY .32 .36 .05 . 08 .27 .01 - .05 - .15 .02 .09
15) RETURN/SALES .04 .09 .09 .22* . 33 .05 - .12 - .16 .24* .28
16) RETURN/ASSETS . 07 .13 .18 .15 .18 .17 - .12 - .18 .26* .28
17) MARKET RETURN - .56 4.37 .07 .05 .05 .15 -.13 - .03 .11 .10
(table con'd)
OB
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9) BRAND NAME
10) ASSET SPEC. .01
11) TASK PROGRAM -.19
12) # OP STATES - .01




17) MARKET RETURN .27





.20 .17 .29** .16
.11 .15 .27 .25* - .05
.11 .16 .20 .15 - .12 .89
.24 - .03 .14 . 04 .13 .04 -.00
(9
Table 5-2: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1989 (n*77)
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) TOTAL SALES1 956.749 2791.753
2} TOTAL ASSETS 915.085 2932.124 . 98
3) # OP OUTLETS 640.96 1742.11 .70 .77
4) AGE 19.00 15.86 - .09 - .10 .07
5) UNABSORBED SLACK - .10 .17 - .15 -.13 - .08 .18
6) ABSORBED SLACK - .03 .17 - .07 - .05 - .06 .16 .87
7) TMT EXPERIENCE 32.25 21.44 - .18 - .18 -.07 .29 .03
8) TMT TENURE 31.21 30.27 _ . * *.29 .25** .29 .39** -.15
1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000)
(table con'd)
CO
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9) BRAND NAME 18.78 3.89 .11 .14 .13 -.06 .07 . 07 .02 .06
10) ASSET SPEC. 15.06 4.00 .01 .03 .15 .00 .16 .12 - .14 -.05
11) TASK PROGRAM 13 .67 3 .65 .09 .09 .14 .12 - .03 - .00 .07 .13
12) # OF STATES 15.23 14.30 .52** . 50 .64** .17 - .16 - .12 .01 .39
13) tt OF COUNTRIES 3.5 9.45 .73** .78 .94** .03 - .05 .00 - .08 .29
14) STRATEGY .33 .36 .03 .04 .24** .12 - .14 - .11 .06 .17
15) RETURN/SALES .03 .11 .15 .15 .20* .13 - .22* -.31** .29 .29
16) RETURN/ASSETS .04 .20 .13 .12 .13 .13 .01 -.15 .23 .25
17) MARKET RETURN - .31 4 .29 .04 .03 .03 - .39 - . 72 -.71** .11 .09
(table con'd)
0000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9) BRAND NAME
10) ASSET SPEC. . 01
11) TASK PROGRAM - .19 -.23*
12) # OF STATES .02 .02 .16
13) # OF COUNTRIES .12 . 13 .09 .59**
14) STRATEGY - . 05 .20 . 14 .28** . 17
15) RETURN/SALES .24* . 00 . 18 .25* . 16 . 10
16) RETURN/ASSETS .23* .00 .19 . 15 . 12 . 06
17) MARKET RETURN .21 . 19 - . 05 .12 . 03 .09
* p <  .05; * * p <  .01
00vo
Table 5-3: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1990 (n=94)
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) TOTAL SALES1 953.819 3060.615
2) TOTAL ASSETS 851.181 3028.288 .98**
3) # OF OUTLETS 630.82 1733.00 .71** .78
4) AGE 20.00 15.85 - .06 - .06 .09
5) UNABSORBED SLACK - .10 .23 - .08 - .08 - .07 - .04
6) ABSORBED SLACK - .04 .20 - .03 - .03 - .02 - .02 .91
7) TMT EXPERIENCE 31.56 20.96 - . 14 - .12 - .03 .32** .04
8) TMT TENURE 30.52 30.13 .31** . „ * *.28 .31** .42** - .02
1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000).
(table con'd)
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9) BRAND NAME 18.78 3.89 .11 .12 .13 - .06 - .02 -.03 .14 .13
10) ASSET SPEC. 15.06 4.00 .03 .06 . 015 . 00 .10 .18 - .14 - . 04
11) TASK PROGRAM 13.67 3.65 .07 .08 . 11 .12 .08 .04 . 03 . 09
12) # OF STATES 15.05 14 .05 .51** .50** .63** .21* -.24* - .17 . 09 .41
13) # OF COUNTRIES 3.59 9.55 .73** .79** .93** .02 -.05 .01 -.05 .29
14) STRATEGY .34 .36 - .01 .00 .19* .11 - .02 - .01 .04 .13
15) RETURN/SALES .02 .20 .10 .10 .15 .13 - .29 -.33** .20* .21
16) RETURN/ASSETS .04 .24 .15 .14 .17 .11 -.18 -.26** . 18 .19
17) MARKET RETURN .86 3 .00 - .08 -.06 - .06 .14 .43** .48** - .24 - .19
(table con'd)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9) BRAND NAME
10) ASSET SPEC. .01
11) TASK PROGRAM - .19* -.23*
12) # OP STATES .01 . 04 .18
13) # OF COUNTRIES . 10 . 14 . 09 .58**
14) STRATEGY -.17 _ „ * .22 .13 .21* .15
15) RETURN/SALES .12 -.09 .10 .27* .10 - . 14
16) RETURN/ASSETS .21 -.11 .16 .25** .10 - .10
17) MARKET RETURN - .04 - .06 - .17 - . 19 - .04 - .19
*  . .  * *  _ .p <  .05; p <  .01
.23
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Table 5-4: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1991 (n=96)
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) TOTAL SALES1 99.954 3314.131
2) TOTAL ASSETS 889.810 3259.896 .98**
3) # OF OUTLETS 636.84 1794.91 .71** .79*
4) AGE 21.00 15.86 - .05 - .05 .10
5) UNABSORBED SLACK - .09 .20 - .03 - .03 - .02 .05
6) ABSORBED SLACK - .02 .19 .03 .03 .03 .06 .93
7) TMT EXPERIENCE 33 .21 22.1 - . 11 - .09 .02 .33** .13
8) TMT TENURE 31.8 29.63 .29 _ . * *.28 .36** .45** .02
1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000)
(table con'd)
VOu>
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9) BRAND NAME 18.77 3.89 .10 .12 .12 -.06 .11 .11 .14 .13
10) ASSET SPEC. 15.06 4.00 .03 .05 .13 .00 .04 . 15 - .13 -.04
11) TASK PROGRAM 13.67 3.65 .07 .08 .12 .12 .17 .17 .05 .12
12) # OF STATES 15.17 14 .20 .52** .51** .63** .21* .00 . 06 .09 .43
13) # OF COUNTRIES 3.79 10.28 .74** .80** .94** .03 - .02 .04 -.01 .33
14) STRATEGY .32 .36 - .02 .00 .17 .14 .06 .06 .01 .12
15) RETURN/SALES - .01 .35 .06 .06 .10 .14 - .10 -.17 .14 .17
16) RETURN/ASSETS .02 .33 .13 .12 .15 .14 - .01 -.09 .13 .21
17) MARKET RETURN .77 3.32 - .07 - .05 - .06 - .05 - .10 -.06 -.03 - .14
(table con'd)
u>
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9) BRAND NAME
10) ASSET SPEC. .01
11) TASK PROGRAM -.19* - .23
12) # OF STATES .07 .00 .19
13) # OF COUNTRIES .10 .13 .09 .58**
14) STRATEGY -.21* .21* .07 .16 . 14
15) RETURN/SALES .07 - .09 .10 .21* .00 - .20
16) RETURN/ASSETS .12 - .06 .17 .26** . 13 - .22
17) MARKET RETURN .10 - .07 .00 -.18 - .05 - .11
* p < .05; ** p < .01
.01
u>ui
Table 5-5: Means, standard deviations, and pearson product-moment correlations for study
variables, 1992 (n=92)
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) TOTAL SALES1 1129.760 3794.282
2) TOTAL ASSETS 989.794 3649.394 .98**
3) # OF OUTLETS 669.69 1901.89 .72** .79
4) AGE 22.00 15.86 - . 06 - .06 .09
5) UNABSORBED SLACK - . 06 .24 - .08 -.07 -.06 - .06
6) ABSORBED SLACK .04 .22 - .06 - .06 - .06 - .11 .87
7) TMT EXPERIENCE 34.82 23.06 - .16 - .14 .00 .32 .09
8) TMT TENURE 32.97 29.56 .20* .20* .32** .45** -.02
1 Total sales and assets are in millions (000,000).
(table con'd)
VO
MEAN STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9) BRAND NAME 18.78 3.89 .10 .12 .13 - .06 .11 .00 . 14 .14
10) ASSET SPEC. 15.06 4.00 .03 . 06 .13 .00 .04 .07 - .06 -.04
11) TASK PROGRAM 13.67 3 .65 . 07 .08 .11 .12 .13 .12 .03 .11
12) # OF STATES 15.64 14.29 .53** .52** .62** . 19 -. 07 - . 09 .09 .42**
13) # OF COUNTRIES 4.08 11.01 .73** .80** .95** .04 - .04 - .03 - .02 .29**
14) STRATEGY .31 .37 .00 .01 .19* .18 .04 .04 .10 .19*
15) RETURN/SALES - .03 .36 .05 .05 .09 .16 - . 01 - .04 .15 .21*
16) RETURN/ASSETS - .02 .43 . 10 .10 . 11 .13 .05 . 04 . 11 .23*
17) MARKET RETURN - .11 2.06 .01 .01 .01 .09 .09 .07 .08 . 00
(table con'd)
VO-j
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
9) BRAND NAME
1 0 ) ASSET SPEC. . 0 1
1 1 } TASK PROGRAM -.19* -.23*
1 2 } # OF STATES .09 - .03 .19
13) # OF COUNTRIES . 1 0 .13 .09 .58**
14) STRATEGY - .2 0 * .19 . 0 0 .2 0 * .18
15) RETURN/SALES .07 - .06 . 1 2 .2 2 * .09 -.18
16) RETURN/ASSETS .09 .03 .15 .25** .15 - .15
17) MARKET RETURN .09 - .15 .04 .03 . 0 1 - . 0 2




Table 5-6: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1988 (n=67)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1) SIZE
2 ) AGE .31**
3) GOVERNANCE - .45*** -.14
4) RESOURCES .05 .25* -.04
5) STRATEGY .03 . 0 1 - .35** - .04
6 ) MR .24 .15 - .09 . 15 . 13
7) AR .47*** .13 . 2 0 .25* - . 1 0 . 0 2
* p <. 05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
voVO
Table 5-7: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1989 (n=77)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1) SIZE
2 ) AGE .17
3) GOVERNANCE - .45*** -.15
4) RESOURCES . 2 0 . 2 1 - .07
5) STRATEGY .05 . 1 2 - .34** . 0 2
6 ) MR .19 -.39** - .17 . 1 0 .09
7) AR .32** .14 - .2 2 * .39*** - .08
* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p < . 0 0 1
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Table 5-8: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1990 (n-94)
1 ) SIZE
2 } AGE .25**
3) GOVERNANCE - .48*** -.16
4) RESOURCES .19 . 2 0 - . 1 0
5) STRATEGY - . 0 1 . 1 1 - .32*** - .04
6 ) MR - .30* .14 .15 .04 - .19
7) AR . 4 4 *** .13 - .15 .09 .07
* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p < . 0 0 1
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Table 5-9: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1991 (n=96)
1 ) SIZE
2 ) AGE .30**
3) GOVERNANCE - .49*** -.15
4) RESOURCES .28* .24* - .16
5) STRATEGY . 0 1 . 14 - .25** - .05
6 } MR -.24** - .05 . 1 2 - .05 - . 1 1
7) AR .34*** . 14 - .15 . 1 2 - .2 1 *
* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p < . 0 0 1
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Table 5-10: Pearson product-moment correlations for aggregate scales, 1992 (n=92)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 ) SIZE
2 ) AGE .25**
3) GOVERNANCE -.49*** -.13
4) RESOURCES .19 .17 - . 1 1
5) STRATEGY .07 .18* - .26** -.05
6 ) MR .07 .09 oH• . 17 - . 0 2
7) AR .26** . 15 - .2 0 * . 18 - .17
* p < .05; ** p < .0 1 ; *** p < . 0 0 1
103
Table 5-11: Effects of the resource stock-governance cost interaction on strategy
1Year AGE2 SIZE GOV RES GOV*RES F Adj. R*
1988
(n=6 6 )
-.06 - .16 - .40*** -.30** - .26* 4 . 81*** .23
1989
(n=77)
.07 - . 2 1 -.35** - .25* - .28** 5.25*** . 2 2
1990
(n=94)
.06 - .26* - .41*** -.25** - .15 5.1 2 *** .18
1991 
(n=96)
. 1 1 - .2 2 * - .35*** - .26** - .2 0 * 5 . 35*** .19
1992
(n=92)
. 1 1 - .2 2 * - .37*** - .25** - .19* 5.37*** .19
1 Year of independent variables.
2 All coefficients are standardized. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
104
105
and p < .05 in three other years (p - .12 in the remaining 
year--1990), initial support was found. Therefore, sample 
firms were placed into groups as described in Chapter 4 
(high resource stock and high governance cost versus all 
others) and the hypothesis was re-tested with ANCOVA. For 
this analysis, a significant partial F statistic for the 
GROUP variable supports the hypothesis. As Table 5-12 
shows, four out of five years are significant at p < . 0 0 1  
and the fifth year (1988) is significant at p < .10. The 
cell means are graphed in Figures 5-1 through 5-5. These 
show clearly that firms with high governance costs and 
high resource stocks use more independent strategies than 
other firms. In sum, hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Hypothesis 2
This hypothesis asserted that resource stocks, 
governance costs, and strategy should work in conjunction 
to influence performance. This hypothesis repeated 
formally below:
Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant three way
interaction effect between resource stocks, 
governance costs, and strategy such that;
(a) firms that choose cooperative 
strategies when resource stocks are low 
regardless of governance costs or when 




Table 5-12: Effects of 
governance
the high resource-high 
group on strategy
1968 df mean square F1
Model
SIZE 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
AGE 1 .137 1.08
GROUP1 1 .463 3,64*
Error 62 7.89
1969 df mean square F
Model
SIZE 1 . 0 2 1 . 18
AGE 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
GROUP 1 1.44 1 2 .2 2 ***
Error 73 8.57
1990 df mean square F
Model
SIZE 1 .056 .49
AGE 1 .016 .14
GROUP 1 1.49 13 .2 1 ***
Error 90 10.16
1991 df mean square F
Model
SIZE 1 .050 .41
AGE 1 .067 .57
GROUP 1 1.54 13.0 1 ***
Error 92 1 0 . 8 8
(table con'd)
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1992 df mean square F
Model
SIZE 1 .030 .25
AGE 1 .126 1.06
GROUP 1 1.60 13.22***
Error 6 8 10.65
1 One-tailed test.
2 GROUP-all firms with higher than average resource 
stocks and higher than average governance costs 
versus all other firms.














Figure 5-1: Percent of independent strategies for high and
















Figure 5-2: Percent of independent strategies for high and














Figure 5-3: Percent of independent strategies for high and


















Figure 5-4: Percent of independent strategies for high and
low resource stock and governance cost
conditions, 1991
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Figure 5-5: Percent of independent strategies for high and
low resource stock and governance cost
conditions, 1992
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(b) firms that choose Independent 
strategies only when resource stocks and 
governance costs are high;
will perform better in subsequent time 
periods than those that do not.
The moderated multiple regression analyses for this 
hypothesis were performed twice as discussed in Chapter 4. 
First, both dependent variables (MR and AR) were tested 
simultaneously in a MMMR model that included control 
variables (AGE, SIZE), independent variables (GOV, RES), 
all two-way interactions (GOV*RES, STRAT*GOV, STRAT*RES), 
and a three-way interaction term (STRAT*RES*GOV). Table 
5-13 reports partial Wilks' lambdas and F equivalents for 
each variable (except two-way interactions7) and a global 
Wilks' lambda for the overall model. The partial Wilks' 
lambda is a measure of the joint effect of each variable 
on the dependent variables, given other variables in the 
model. A significant partial Wilks' lambda for the three- 
way interaction in Table 5-13 would indicate support for 
hypothesis 2 and this is not the case in any study year.
Since the multivariate analysis reduced the sample 
size and statistical power considerably, univariate MMR 
results for each performance measure are reported in Table 
5-14 and 5-15. Significant three-way interaction terms
7Because coefficients for two-way (control variable) 
interactions have no theoretical meaning, they are not 
shown.
Table 5-13: Joint effects of governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy interaction 
on performance
Year1 AGE SIZE GOV RES STRAT
Three-way2 
interaction Overall
1988 . 053 .13 .12 .01 .07 .65 .64*
<n=35) (,58)4 (1.75) (1.68) ( .07) (.92) (1.87) (1.78)
1989 .05 .08 .04 .16 .04 .01 .43
(n=43) (.93) (1.47) (.70) (3.12)* (.74) (.07) (1.14)
1990 .01 .14 .06 .06 .13 .07 .41
(n=46) (.16) (2.84) (.97) (1.20) (2.65) (1.28) (1.17)
1991 .02 .07 .08 .01 .14 .02 .36
(n=55) (.43) (1.76) (1.82) ( .11) (3.67)* ( .41) (1.20)
1992 .04 .01 .07 .13 .11 .01 .44
(n=67) (1-00) (.01) (2.25) (4.22)* (3.48)* ( .10) (2.12)**
1 Year of independent variables.
2 Two-way control interactions have no theoretical basis and are not reported.
3 (1 - Wilks' lambda), an estimate of the percent of joint variance explained.
4 F equivalent of Wilks' lambda; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Table 5-14: Effect of governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy interaction on
market returns
Year1 AGE2 SIZE GOV RES STRAT
Three-way3
interaction F Adj. R*
1988
(n-36)
-.17 - .24 - .51* .20 - .25 .29 1.15. . 04
1989
(n=45)
- .26 - .05 + .26 .16 . 17 .24 1.03 .01
1990
(n=40)
.02 - .23 .26 .17 .13 .24 1.16 .03
1991
(n=55)
- . 14 - .20 .01 .00 - . 15 -.07 .54 0
1992
(n=68)
- .18 - .02 - .01 .36** -.03 .07 2.38 .16*
1 Year of independents variables.
2 All coefficients are standardized.
3 Two-way interactions have no theoretical basis and are not reported. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Table 5-15: Effect of governance costs, resource stocks, and strategy on accounting
returns
Year1 AGE2 SIZE GOV RES STRAT
Three-way3
interaction F Adj . R*
1988-89
(n=52)
.07 .28 .07 .39** .03 .06 3.17** .27
1989 
(n=64)
.09 .12 -.11 .35** -.10 - . 11 3.34** .25
1990
(n=77)
- .01 .35** -.05 - .03 - .18 - .23 2.63** .16
1991
(n=81J
- .02 .18 - .23* .09 - .31** - .13 5.15*** .32
1992
(n=80)
.01 .02 - .34** .08 - .34** .02 4.56*** .29
1 Year of independent variables.
2 All coefficients are standardized.
3 Two-way interactions have no theoretical basis and are not reported. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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would indicate support for hypothesis 2 and this is not 
the case in any study year.
Sub-group analysis was then performed by taking the 
groups created in the sub-group analysis for hypothesis 1 
(Figure 3-2) and partitioning each group at its mean 
strategy value. This created the eight conditions shown 
in Figure 3-3. Firms in these eight groups were then 
placed into one of two groups (GROUP in Table 5-16) 
defined by whether hypothesis 2 showed them as performing 
or non-performing conditions (i.e., shaded versus non­
shaded cells in Figure 3-3) . Table 5-16 reports partial 
Wilks' lambdas and its F equivalents for the independent 
variables (i.e., SIZE, AGE, and GROUP). These measure the 
joint effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
variables (i.e., AR and MR). Partial multivariate F 
statistics for each independent variable (i.e., SIZE, AGE, 
and GROUP) on each dependent variable (i.e., AR and MR) 
are also reported. These measure the univariate effect 
(in contrast to joint effects) of each independent 
variable on each dependent variable, given all other 
variables in the model. A significant partial Wilks' 
lambda (or its F equivalent) for the GROUP variable in 
Table 5-16 (MANCOVA) would indicate support for the 
interaction's joint effect on the performance measures. 
None is significant in any study year. A significant
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Table 5-16: Joint effects of hypothesized "high" and "low" 
predicted performance groups on actual 
performance
1988 (n-36) AR1 MR2 Wilks' 3 F4
SIZE 6.25** .33 .16 2 . 97
AGE .66 .38 .06 . 93
GROUP .00 1.01 .04 .64
1989 (n*47) AR MR Wilks' F
SIZE 3 .68 .07 .05 1.00
AGE .75 2.15 .07 1.60
GROUP .76 3.84* .08 1. 98
1990 (n-49) AR MR Wilks' F
SIZE 5.57* 1.85 .10 2 .54
AGE . 59 .00 .01 .32
GROUP 1.12 . 16 .02 .60
1991 (n-57) AR MR Wilks' F
SIZE 5.37* 2.76 .10 3 .01*
AGE .05 .36 .01 .22
GROUP 1.84 .76 .04 1.14
1992 <n-69) AR MR Wilks' F
SIZE 1.82 .25 .03 . 99
AGE .17 2.54 .05 1.67
GROUP .14 .7 .02 .51
1 Partial F for accounting returns .
2 Partial F for market returns.
3 (1 - Wilks' lambda), an estimate of joint variance.
4 F equivalent of Wilks' lambda.
5 One-tailed test; * p < .05
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partial F for GROUP in Table 5-16 would indicate support 
for the interaction's effect on a single performance 
measure. Only one out of ten of these is significant {MR 
in 1989}.
To insure that these results were not due to low 
statistical power, group means for hypothesized high and 
low performing groups were plotted for market returns and 
accounting returns in Figures 5-6 and 5-7 respectively.
If these non-significant results were due to low 
statistical power, a consistent pattern of superior 
performance by hypothesized high performers would be 
expected--even it the difference was not statistically 
significant. This is clearly not the case. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 is not supported.
Sunmary
This chapter presented the results of tests of the 
study's two hypotheses. Support for these hypotheses 
depended on the identification of significant interaction 
terms in regression equations and sub-group analysis 
(ANCOVA and MANCOVA). The interaction specified in 
hypothesis 1 was significant and in a form consistent with 
the hypothesis. Hence, this hypothesis was supported. 
Similar interaction terms were not significant for 
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Figure 5-6: Average market returns for hypothesized high 
and low performance groups
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Figure 5-7: Average accounting returns for hypothesized 
high and low performance groups
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews the study's results and 
discusses the implications of these findings for future 
research and practice. It is organized as follows.
First, the results from hypothesis 1 and 2 are summarized. 
Second, the significant findings are discussed along with 
their implications for past and future research. Non­
significant findings and their implications for future 
inquiry are discussed third. Fourth, some implications 
are drawn for practicing managers. Fifth, the study's 
limitations are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
from the results.
Summary of Results
This study sought to integrate resource and 
governance theories of horizontal strategy and link this 
synthesis to performance. Hypothesis 1, which integrated 
resource and governance to predict strategy, was 
supported. It stated that firms with low resource stocks 
would use cooperative strategies (i.e., joint ventures, 
management contracts, and franchising) to access needed 
resources, regardless of the governance costs they may 
face. However, if the firm possessed sufficient stocks of 
strategically valuable resources, it would select 
strategies in accordance with governance theory (i.e., 
independent strategies when governance costs are high and
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cooperative strategies when governance costs are low) . 
Hypothesis 2 stated that when firms selected strategy in 
conjunction with this synthesis, they would perform 
better. This, however, was not supported.
Discussion of Significant Results
The most important finding of this study is that a 
synthesis of resource and governance explains strategy 
better than either theory independently. This finding has 
direct implications for: (1) scope literature, (2) other
theories of strategy, (3) prior research, and (4) resource 
and governance theory. These are discussed below.
Implications for scope literature. The study's 
clearest contribution is in the context in which the 
hypotheses were tested--horizontal scope. Most prior 
research viewed horizontal expansion from a single 
theoretical perspective (e.g., Anderson, 1985; Anderson & 
Coughlan, 1987; Brickley & Dark, 1907; Lafontaine, 1992) . 
The synthesis presented here provides a robust explanation 
of how managers choose among alternative horizontal 
strategies. It therefore furnishes a fuller understanding 
of the determinants of strategic choice than was available 
in prior research.
This understanding then, provides the necessary 
groundwork for horizontal scope literature to advance. 
First, future inquiry can examine other factors that may
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improve predictive power in models of horizontal strategy. 
For example, an organization's environment has been shown 
to influence strategic choice (Dess, et al., 1990). Thus, 
adding environmental effects to future investigations may 
advance horizontal strategy research by increasing its 
predictive power beyond the present study. Second, since 
prior research has been unable to link alternative 
horizontal strategies to performance (e.g., Anderson,
1984), these findings may provide the insights needed to 
accomplish this objective. Future inquiry can more easily 
present a theory of horizontal strategy performance that 
builds on the integrated logic of both theories. A step 
in this direction is attempted in the next section.
Since foreign entry strategies are a form of 
horizontal expansion, the literature on foreign entry 
strategies may benefit from these results. This 
literature has also relied heavily on resource and 
governance theories (e.g., Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; 
Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Reid, 1983) to predict strategy. 
Because governance costs are inflated by the uncertainty 
and complexity of foreign entry (Anderson & Gatignon,
1986}, it would be interesting to see if the resource 
stock-governance cost interaction applies in this context. 
Such a study may find that only a few core resources are 
important enough to usurp governance concerns (cf. Oviatt
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& McDougall, 1994) . If so, then research must identify 
what constitutes a "core" resource. Because these 
resources have been described as socially complex and 
causally ambiguous {Barney, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), 
"fine-grained" research methods may be needed to 
understand them better (i.e., Eisenhardt, 1989b). Then, 
tools to measure these resources will be needed so that 
more traditional methodologies can test important 
substantive relationships (Schwab, 1980).
The integration of resource and governance has 
implications for research beyond horizontal scope. The 
diversification literature (i.e., industry scope) has 
focused almost exclusively on resource relatedness to 
predict diversification strategy and performance (Goold & 
Luchs, 1993). Diversification strategy research (i.e., 
acquisition versus direct entry) has shown that firms 
prefer direct entry into new businesses when those 
businesses' resources are highly related to existing 
businesses (e.g., Chatterjee 1990; Yip, 1982). Since the 
relatedness of resources among businesses covaries 
strongly with the costs of governing those businesses 
(Teece, 1980), the question for future research implied by 
this study is whether the quantity of resources interacts 
with resource relatedness. These results suggest that 
resource deficient firms use cooperative strategies to
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diversify even in the face of highly related resource 
combinations (i.e., low governance costs) while wealthier 
firms use cooperative strategies only when businesses are 
unrelated (i.e., high governance costs).
In contrast to the diversification literature, the 
vertical integration literature has centered on two non­
resource based explanations for vertical integration 
strategy: (1) governance costs and (2) strategic risks.
The governance cost explanation of vertical integration 
argues that integration (i.e., independent strategies) 
will occur when the costs of negotiating with and 
monitoring external agents is too high. The strategic 
risks explanation for vertical integration predicts that 
firms will not integrate (i.e., cooperative strategies) in 
the face of environmental dynamism because integration 
decreases strategic flexibility (Harrigan, 1963) . An 
interesting extension of this study would be to examine 
how resource stocks moderate these explanations of 
vertical integration. Contrary to governance theory 
predictions, this study's results suggest that high 
governance costs firms will not integrate if they cannot 
afford to do so (i.e., do not have resources). Likewise, 
one might speculate that wealthy firms may still integrate 
(i.e., ignore strategic risks) in the face of dynamism to 
produce an additional buffer around their core activities
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(cf. Thompson, 1967). Consequently, in the 1980s we had 
silicon valley firms in the dynamic computer industry 
outsourcing almost every activity while resource rich IBM 
still maintained most functions in-house (Quinn, Doorley,
& Paquette, 1990).
Implications for other theories. The synthesis of 
resource and governance can also inform other theories of 
organization. Evolutionary theory (e.g., Levinthal & 
Myatt, 1994) attempts to explain how bundles of resources 
evolve in different firms over time to shape competition 
(Barney & Zajac, 1994). Because this study found 
different strategy-governance profiles at each level of 
resource stocks, an evolutionary view would imply that 
strategy must change over time as the firm's resources 
evolve. This would suggest the need for longitudinal 
research to observe how the pattern of resource evolution 
affects strategy. If such a study found a pattern of 
"punctuated equilibrium" (Gersick, 1991), this would have 
important implications for research and practice since not 
all strategies can flexibly deal with "quantum" changes in 
resource availability. For example, firms that use 
independent strategies during stable periods of resource 
munificence may find themselves over-exposed to these 
strategies after a quantum change to a new, resource 
scarce, environment (cf. Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).
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Indeed, resource stocks were a significant predictor of 
performance, as measured by accounting returns (Table 5- 
15), during the early years of this study (i.e., 1988 & 
1989). However, as the general U.S. economy continued to 
slow down in 1990, 1991, and 1992, firms with greater 
resources apparently could no longer manage those 
resources efficiently. In those years, governance costs 
became paramount to improved accounting returns.
This study may also benefit configurational research. 
This body of literature attempts to define sets of firms, 
called configurations, with a common profile of 
conceptually independent organizational variables (Miller 
& Mintzberg, 1984) and relate these to a criterion of 
interest (usually performance). Defining the important 
dimensions that will help researchers identify "true" 
configurations is central to this process (Thomas & 
Venkatraman, 1988). Although resource stocks and strategy 
(often defined as scope) have been acknowledged as 
important strategic dimensions for defining configurations 
(e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1987; Piegenbaum & ThomaB, 1993), 
the potential role of governance costs has been ignored. 
Since these findings suggest that both resources and 
governance are important predictors of strategy, it would 
be interesting to see if governance costs can add power to 
configurational inquiry.
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Implications for prior research. The results of 
hypothesis 1 point to a moderated relationship between 
firms' absolute quantity of resource stocks and their 
costs of governing external agents. The presence of an 
interaction effect means that main effects are 
uninterpretable (Pedhazur, 1962) . Therefore, this result 
implies that prior research that considered only one 
theoretical perspective (i.e., resource or governance) 
need to be reevaluated.
To further clarify, this result demonstrates a 
resource stock and governance cost--strategy relationship, 
but not a resources stock--strategy and a governance cost- 
-strategy relationship. The data presented in Table 5-11 
and 5-12, and visualized in Figures 5-1 through 5-5 show 
that it is only in the high resource-high governance 
condition that firms significantly alter their strategy. 
Hence, any significant main effects, like the ones for 
resource stocks (RES) and governance costs (GOV) in Table 
5-11, are simply a statistical artifact of the interaction 
(the high resource-high governance condition). If this 
study had investigated resource stocks or governance costs 
and their influence on strategy independently, the 
positive results would have been uninterpretable because
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an important explanatory variable, the interaction term, 
would have been left out of the model.6
If these results generalize to other samples and to 
related research questions, then much of the prior 
research, which is centered in a single theoretical 
perspective, may have uninterpretable results. For 
example, in Eisenhardt's (1965) test of agency theory she 
identified a positive relationship between job 
programmability and the use of salaries (versus 
commissions) in retail sales operations. It is possible, 
however, that her results simply reflect the influence of 
a few sample firms with high resources and highly 
programmable jobs--in the same way that the influence of 
governance costs (including task programmability) in this 
study was simply a reflection of the intense use of 
independent strategies by those firms with vast resources 
and high governance costs.
The example is applicable to resource based research 
as well. For instance, Russo's (1991) investigation of 
how cash reserves (a resource) increase the adoption of 
the M-form (see: Chandler, 1962) could be re-evaluated in 
light of these findings. If a sub-sample of his utilities
8 When an omitted variable is correlated with an 
included variable (as RES*G0V is correlated with RES and 
GOV), beta estimates for included variables are biased to 
the extent of the correlation (Studenmund & Cassidy, 1987, 
p. 121-124).
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with excess cash and unusually high governance costs (also 
a determinant of the M-form: Williamson, 1975) were making 
the majority of M-form transformations, then his finding 
of a main resource effect (i.e., cash) may be inaccurate.
These two examples are not an indication that these 
or any other main effects found in prior resource or 
governance literature are uninterpretable. However, until 
the original studies are replicated and extended, there is 
no way to know. Therefore, an important implication of 
these results is that previously assumed one-way effects 
from resources or governance on any criteria of interest 
need to be re-investigated by considering the other 
theory. Such research would not only keep future 
researchers from building inaccurate models, but would 
also help establish boundaries around the resource- 
governance interaction (cf. Bacharach, 1989).
Implication for resource and governance theory. A 
related implication of this study's integration of 
resource and governance theories stems from the finding 
that resource concerns take precedence over governance. 
Because traditional governance arguments broke down under 
low resource conditions, one might also expect start-up 
ventures, bankruptcy candidates, turnarounds, and 
downsizing firms, to ignore governance costs. In these 
low resource contexts, greater emphasis would be placed on
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resource gathering (cooperative) strategies. In contrast, 
this result suggests that firms with significant stocks of 
strategically valuable resources (e.g., mature industries 
and government protected industries) do pay close 
attention to governance costs. This result can help 
future researchers frame studies that recognize the 
contextual limitations of each theory. For example, a 
researcher may want to look for an interaction between 
governance costs and strategy making processes (cf. 
Mintzberg, 1973) on organizational structure. Given this 
study's findings, one might control the influence of 
resources by performing such tests with a resource 
equivalent sample.
Discussion of Non-significant Results
Strategic management researchers have often pointed 
to the centrality of organizational performance for the 
field (e.g., Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990).
Therefore, this study attempted to link the interaction 
between resource stocks, governance costs, and horizontal 
strategy to performance. However, this hypothesis was not 
supported. There are several explanations. One 
possibility is that strategy does not affect performance. 
Population ecologists, for example, would argue that 
strategic decisions by managers are not significant 
determinants of performance in light of the coercive
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influences of environmental selection (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). Likewise, strategy may not impact performance 
because they are "loosely coupled" (cf. Weick, 1976), 
meaning changes in strategy do not necessarily translate 
into changes in performance. However, given the number of 
studies linking strategy and performance (see: Capon et 
al., [1990] for a meta-analysis), this seems unlikely.
Another possibility is that performance was modeled 
incorrectly. The results of this study (i.e., hypothesis 
1) show that the interaction between resource stocks and 
governance costs is related to strategy and others have 
shown how strategy can affect performance (e.g., Dess & 
Davis, 1984; Rumelt, 1974; Snow & Hrebiniak, I960). Thus, 
the interaction between resource stocks and governance 
costs may only influence performance through strategy. 
Rather than the three-way interaction specified by 
hypothesis 2, the relationship may be more accurately 
described as moderated mediation (cf. James & Brett,
1984). In addition to moderated mediation, extant 
research supports a direct relationship between a firm's 
level of resource stocks and performance (e.g., Haleblian 
& Finkelstein, 1993; Robins & Wiersema, 1995). Hence, the 
model in Figure 6-1, which combines moderated mediation 
(i.e., RES*G0V-->STRAT-->PERFORM) and a direct resource 







Figure 6-1: A revised model of the effects of resource 
stocks, governance costs, and strategy on 
performance
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accurate explanation of how resource stocks, governance 
costb , and strategy affect performance.
A post hoc analysis was performed to determine the 
efficacy of this model. For both dimensions of 
performance (i.e., market [MR] and accounting returns 
[AR]), the following two equations were contrasted for 
each study year:
(1) STRAT - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES
(2) PERFORM - SIZE, AGE, GOV, RES, GOV*RES, STRAT 
Evidence that horizontal strategy mediates the 
relationship between the resource stock-governance cost 
interaction and performance would be indicated if three 
conditions are met: (1) the interaction term in equation l 
must be significant (i.e., GOV*RES-->STRAT), (2) the 
strategy term in equation 2 must be significant (STRAT--
>PERFORM), and (3) the interaction term in equation 2 must 
be non-significant (GOV*RES-/->PERFORM) (cf. Venkatraman, 
1989).
The first condition of the test for moderated 
mediation (GOV*RES-->STRAT) was confirmed by hypothesis 1 
(Table 5-11 and 5-12). Tests of the second condition for 
moderated mediation (STRAT-->PERFORM) showed mixed 
results. When market returns (MR) are considered, the 
mediation effect depicted in Figure 6-1 is not supported
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(i.e., non-significant in all years). However, when 
accounting returns (AR) are the dependent variable, 
the strategy term (STRAT) approaches significance at p ■ 
.12 in 1990 and becomes significant at p < .01 in 1991 and
1992. Finally, the third condition (RES*GOV-/->PERFORM)
was confirmed in all years. Hence, there is weak evidence 
of a mediation effect on this dimension (i.e., efficiency 
as measured by accounting returns [AR]) of performance.
The model also specifies a direct resource stock 
effect on performance. A post hoc analysis of this 
assertion was examined using the following equations:®
MR - SIZE, AGE, STRAT, RES
AR - SIZE, AGE, STRAT, RES.
When market returns are the dependent variable the 
resource stock-performance effect is significant in only 
one year (1992). Thus, a direct resource stock effect on 
stock market performance is not supported. When 
accounting returns are the dependent variable, the 
coefficient for resource stocks is significant at p < .01 
in two years (1986 and 1989) and approaches significance 
in a third (p * .12 in 1992) . Hence, there is weak 
support for a resource stock effect on the efficiency 
dimension of performance.
^Because strategy is a predictor of performance in the 
model, it must be controlled while testing the resource 
stock-performance relationship.
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Although the moderated mediation model presented in 
Figure 6-1 must be rejected when performance is measured 
by market returns (MR), when accounting returns (AR) are 
considered, this analysis furnishes preliminary evidence 
that the synthesis of resource and governance theories 
presented in this study may have important performance 
implications. Results from hypothesis 1 showed that 
managers are using horizontal strategy as a tool to 
balance the conflicting influences of resource stocks and 
governance costs. This additional analysis suggests that 
the selection of strategy then affects the organization's 
efficiency directly. Thus, one promising avenue for 
future research would be to view horizontal strategy as a 
mediating variable between its antecedents (resource 
stocks and governance costs in this context) and 
performance. Thus far, this approach has been rare in the 
strategic management literature (Venkatraman, 1989).
A third possible explanation of the resource- 
governance-strategy to performance relationship is that 
their interaction is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
precursor to enhanced organizational performance. When 
managers are selecting strategies in accordance with both 
resource and governance concerns, it becomes possible to 
increase performance. However, actual performance may co- 
depend on other processes within the organization (i.e.,
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site selection, human resource practices, purchasing, and 
marketing). Responding to resource and governance 
conditions to select strategy may not be enough to 
guarantee performance--other factors may need to be 
present. Therefore, future research can benefit by 
looking closely at other important variables that may 
affect performance.
A final possibility is that the relationship between 
resources, governance, and strategy on performance should 
be viewed from a configurational perspective. As noted, 
organizational configurations are defined as groups of 
firms that covary systematically along several important 
dimensions (Miller & Mintzberg, 1984) . This study 
investigated the bivariate association between a set of 
interactions and performance. However, bivariate 
relationships are often under specified (i.e., omitted 
variables) or incorrectly specified (i.e., non-linear) 
(Miller, 1981). Because configurations are made up of 
firms with a similar confluence of important 
organizational variables, complex, but stable, sets of 
inter-relationships can be holistically linked to 
performance (e.g., Ketchen, Thomas, Snow, 1993). Given 
that resource stocks, governance costs, and strategy are 
only three components of complex organizations, a 
configurational approach would appear useful. For
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example, a configurational study might find configurations 
of firms that are alike in terms of resource stocks, 
governance costs, horizontal strategy, internal structure, 
strategy making processes, and environment. Members of 
some configurations may then be found to perform better 
than members of others.
Implications for Practice
The model of horizontal strategy choice presented 
here also has implications for practicing managers.
Whether or not managers should select independent 
strategies only under high resource-high governance cost 
conditions remains to be empirically established.
However, the logic of the model strongly suggests that 
firms can optimize long-term effectiveness (through 
resource acquisition) and efficiency (through governance 
cost minimization) by seeking cooperative strategies under 
low resource stock conditions and minimizing governance 
costs when resource stocks are sufficient. Indeed these 
results show that many firms are choosing this pattern of 
horizontal strategy. Unless these firms are engaging in 
poor performance strategies en masse, there is likely some 
value for managers that has, so far, eluded researchers.
At the very least, awareness of these results should 
help managers do more accurate competitive analyses. If 
cooperative strategies are useful for garnering resources
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as this theory suggests, then firms with ample resources, 
resting at the top of their industry, may be able to 
identify potential challengers more quickly by examining 
their strategies for growth. Likewise, firms on the 
competitive fringe may be able to identify and react to 
competitive threats in their local or regional markets 
more quickly by monitoring competitors' strategy. 
Limitations
As with all research in the social sciences, this 
study suffers from some notable limitations.
Specifically, this study suffers from (1) limited 
generalizability, (2) its aggregated measures of resource 
stocks and governance costs, and (3) failure to address 
potential feedback loops.
Limited generalizabilitv. This is the only extant 
study that investigates the moderating effect of resource 
stocks on the governance cost--strategy relationship but 
it is confined to a single industry {i.e. food service) 
and a single research setting (i.e., horizontal expansion 
strategy). However, resource and governance theories have 
been applied in several research settings including,* (1) 
diversification (e.g., Chatterjee, 1990; Teece, 1980), (2)
upper echelons, (e.g., Boeker & Goodstein, 1993), (3)
vertical integration (e.g., Williamson, 1975), (4) foreign
entry (Reid, 1981; 1983), and (5) entrepreneurship (e.g.,
141
Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). They have also been tested 
with a variety of samples including: (1) retailing (e.g., 
Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988), exporting (e.g., Anderson & 
Coughlan, 1987), utilities (e.g., Russo, 1991), and 
Fortune 500 firms (e.g., Robins & Wiersema, 1995). Most 
of these studies investigate a research question from a 
single perspective (i.e., resource or governance) without 
consideration of the other. Since the existence of a 
moderator effect signifies that main effects are 
uninterpretable, it is very important that the strength 
and boundaries of this relationship are understood. From 
this study, it remains unclear whether the moderation 
effect found in the present study and its potential 
implications apply in other research settings. Therefore, 
future research can be advanced through a re-evaluation 
and extension of some of these original studies by adding 
the omitted theory (either resource or governance) to one­
way relationships currently offered in the literature.
Construct aggregation. In order to derive a global 
measure of the quantity of resource stocks or governance 
costs, this study overlooked other features of these 
constructs such as quality and type. However, these 
features of resource stocks and governance costs can vary 
in their influence on strategy. Resources named in the 
literature as potentially valuable (e.g., organization
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culture, secret processes, top management skills, capital 
access, R&D skills) differ by context (e.g., industry, 
life-cycle stage) as to their importance, ease of 
appropriation, and imitability (Barney, 1986; Lippman & 
Rumelt, 1982). Similarly, governance costs are composed 
of ex ante negotiation costs and ex post monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, and residual (maladaptation) losses (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1975), and 
different strategies have different capacities to counter 
these costs (Williamson, 1991) . By using unit weighted 
scales to measure the total quantity of resource stocks 
and governance costs, this study fails to account for 
quality and type differences. Fortunately, efforts have 
begun to understand the differential impact of different 
types of resources (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1994).
Feedback loops. The model tested in this study 
ignores the possibility of feedback loops. However, 
several viable and potentially confounding feedback loops 
do exist. Starting with the criterion, firms that perform 
well can be expected to have increasing financial 
resources that permit the firm to invest in additional 
stocks of resources such as advertising (i.e., brand name 
reputation), research and development, and human capital. 
Thus, there is a likely feedback from performance to 
resource stocks. Profitable firms should also be more
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capable using profits to shift toward independent 
strategies (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Although this 
argument is already embedded indirectly in the model 
through the resource stock--strategy link, a direct 
performance to strategy feedback was not investigated.
Feedback loops also may flow from strategy. The 
model stated that low resource firms would use cooperative 
strategies to access needed resources. However, accessing 
these resources through cooperative strategies would 
likely change the firm's level of resource stocks. For 
example, if franchising and joint venturing quickly spread 
the firm's brand name reputation, then the firm's stock of 
this resource would be increased. Thus, strategy can 
influence resource stocks. Finally, strategy can, over 
time, influence governance costs. For example, if 
cooperative strategies permit the firm to place operations 
in more geographically dispersed locations then this 
dispersion would decrease the firm's relative cost of 
governing external agents (i.e., cooperative partners), 
potentially leading to even more cooperative strategies.
Since these potential feedback loops demonstrate that 
resource stocks, governance costs, and horizontal strategy 
are related in a complex fashion, future research could 
benefit by examining the fit of a structural equation 
model. Such a study would provide a deeper and more
144
complex understanding of the relationship between these 
constructs and help clarify the strength of these feedback 
loops.
Conclusions
This study sought to integrate two distinct theories 
of the firm--resource theory and governance theory--in the 
context of horizontal expansion strategies and link this 
synthesis to organizational performance. Resource theory 
argues that firms select strategies to help them access 
and control sufficient stocks of strategically valuable 
resources (e.g., Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984) . Governance theory suggests 
that firm strategy rests upon the economizing of 
governance costs (e.g., Coase, 1937; Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1991). Here, it 
was proposed that firms with few resources would place the 
long-term strategic concern of resource building in front 
of short-term efficiency (i.e., governance minimizing) 
concerns. It was also thought that firms that behaved in 
this manner would perform better than competitors who 
respond differently.
Resource, governance, strategy, and performance data 
from 1988-1993 were collected on 101 public food service 
chains. Moderated multiple regression and sub-group 
analysis (ANCOVA) confirmed the expected interaction
145
between resource stocks and governance costs on strategy. 
However, no three-way interaction effect on performance 
was detected.
The most important finding of this study is that 
resource and governance theories can predict strategy 
better than either theory independently in the context of 
horizontal scope. This result should increase 
researchers' understanding of the dynamics of strategic 
choice along all scope dimensions (i.e., horizontal, 
industry, and vertical). Such understanding should play a 
useful role in helping future researchers link strategy to 
organizational performance
For practicing managers, these results show that 
their competitors are likely to respond simultaneously to 
resource and governance forces. At the very least, this 
knowledge should enhance the quality of competitive 
analyses. However, greater practical relevance will have 
to await further empirical examination of horizontal 
strategy's effect on performance.
As with all research, this work suffered from a 
number of limitations, including poor statistical power 
limited generalizability, heavily aggregated measures, and 
unspecified feedback loops. Nevertheless, the step taken 
here to synthesize the resource and governance literatures 
is significant. Until this point, these bodies of
146
literature were working in parallel to explain some of the 
same phenomena. However, as this study demonstrates, the 
knowledge base in strategic management would be better 
served to see these as complementary.
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APPENDIX
Food Service Strategy in the 90's
This survey of selected hospitality experts Is an 
important part of a larger study of food service 
growth strategies and their impact on firm 
profitability
For each  question, p lease circle the number that b est  
indicates your opinion of the food service operation listed 
at the top of the page by comparing it to other food service 
operations, If you are not familiar with a company, skip 
that page.
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y
Prvarfjv ifftf 0/  M ottoq tm tr t t
C oN fff 0/ i u n n t t t




Comparing this company to all other food service operations.
...how respected Is this company?
...how good ol a value is this company 
perceived to provide for tha prica?
... how strong ft this company's reputation tor 
oonsMsnt quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name 
recognition In Its strvica area?
...how long would It taka to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would H take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would It ve to communicate Job 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would ft be to Include att of the 


































...how difficult would il be to use We 






...how difficult would K be to use this 
company’s dining room decor for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficult 5 6 7
...how dffftcuH would ft be to convert an 
average unit's bullcHng and grounds into 
another type of business?











International House of Pancakes (1-Hop)
Comparing this company to all other food service operations....
.how respected It thia company?
...how good of a valuo It thia company 
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong la thia company’s reputation lor 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company’s brand name 
recognition In Ha service area?
...how long would It take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would It taka to train competent 
hourty employees?
...how difficult would It vs to communicate fob 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the 






Not Good very Good
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Strong Very Strong
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Strong Very Strong
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Long Very Long
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Long Very Long
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Difficult Very Difficult
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Difficult very Difficult
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
...how difficult would It be to uee this 






...how difficult would It be to use this 
company’s dining room decor for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 4 5
Very Difficult 
6 7
...how difficult would It be to convert an 
average unit’s building and grounds into 
another type of business?













Comparing this company to all other food service operations..
.how respected is this company?
...how good of a value la this company 
paicaivad to provide for tha price?
... how strong Is this company's rsputatkm for 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company’s brand name 
recognition In Its service area?
...how long would It take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent 
hourty employees?
...how difficult would It ve to communicate job 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the 



















* 5 6 7
Very Good 
4 5 6 7
Very Strong 
4 5 6 7
Very Strong 









...how difficult would It be to use this 
company’s kitchen equipment for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficult 4 5 6 7
...how difficult would H be to use this 
company's dining room decor for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficult 4 5 6 7
...how difficult would it be to convert an 
average unit’s building and grounds Into 
another type of business?







4 5 6 7
Very Customized
4 5 6 7
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Pizza Hut
Comparing this company to all other food  service operations....
...haw respected is this company?
Not Respected
1 2 3
...how good of s  value is this company 
perceived to provide tor the price?
... how strong is this company’s reputation for 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name 
recognition In its service area?
...how long would It take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would it take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would It ve to communicate job 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the 
unit manager's job tasks In an operations 
manual?
...how difficult would H be to use this 
company’s kitchen equipment for another food 
service format?
...how difficult would ft be to use this 
company's dining room decor for another food 
service format?
...how difficult would it be to convert an 
average unit's building and grounds into 
another type of business?

















































Comparing this company to all o tter food service operations.
...how respected Is this company?
...how good of a value la this company 
perceived to provide for ths price?
... how strong is this company's reputation for 
conatalant quality and service?
...how strong Is this company's brand name 
recognition in its service area?
...how long would it take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would it ve to communicate job 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to include all of the 



















4 5 6 7
Very Good 











4 5 6 7
Very Difficult 
4 5 6 7
...how difficult would it be to use this 
company's kitchen equipment for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficult 4 5 6 7
...how difficult would ft be to use this 





4 5 6 7
...how difficult would H be to convert an 
average unit's building and grounds Into 
another type of business?







4 5 6 7
Very Customized
4 5 6 7
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Nathan’s Famous
Comparing this company to all other food service operations....
...how respected to thto company?
Not Respected
1 2 3
...how good of a value to thto company 
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong to thto company's reputation for 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong to thto company's brand name 
recognition in Its service area?
...how long would It take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would It va to communicate fob 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the 
unit manager's Job tasks In an operations 
manual?
...how difficult would It be to use thto 
company's kitchen equipment for another food 
service lormat?
...how difficult would It be to use thto 
company's dining room decor for another food 
service format?
...how difficult would it be to convert an 
average unit's building and grounds Into 
another type of business?

























4 5 6 7
Very Good 


























Comparing this company to all other food service operations....




4 5 6 7
...how good of a value is this company 
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong is this company’s reputation for 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name 
recognition in Its service area?
...how long would it take to train competent 
asaistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent 
hourty employees?
Not Good Very Good
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Strong Very Strong
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Strong Very Strong
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Long Very Long
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Long Very Long
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
...how difficult would it ve to communicate fob 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would it be to include all of the 










...how difficult would it be to use this 






...how difficult would It be to use this 






...how difficult would it be to convert an 
average unit’s building and grounds into 
another type of buelness?












Comparing this company to all other food service operations....
...how respected is this company?
...how good of a valuo is this company 
perceived to provide for tha pries?
... how strong is this company's reputation lor 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this compsn/s brand name 
recognition in Its service area?
...how long would it take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would N take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would it ve to communicate fc>b 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how dNficult would H be to include ail of the 


































...how difficult would It be to use this 
company’s kitchen equipment for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficull e 7
...how difficult would H be to use this 
company’s dining room decor for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficult 6 7
...how difficult would It be to convert an 
average unit's building and grounds Into 
another type of business?












Comparing this company to ail other food service operations....
...how respected it this company?
Not Respected 
1 2 3
...how good of a value Is this company 
perceived to provide for the price?
... how strong Is this company’s reputation for 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name 
recognition In Its service area?
...how long would It take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would It vs to communicate job 
requirements to unit leva) managers?
...how difficult would It be to Include all of the 
































...how difficult would it be to use this 
company's kitchen equipment for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult I 2 Very Difficult 6 7
...how difficult would It be to use this 
company's dining room decor lor another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 4 5 Very Difficult 6 7
...how difficult would it be to convert an 
average unit's building and grounds Into 
another type of business?












Comparing this company to all other food set
...how respected is this company?
...how good of a value is this company 
perceived to provide tor the price?
S....
... how strong is this company's reputation tor 
consistent quality and service?
...how strong is this company's brand name 
recognition in its service area?
...how long would it take to train competent 
assistant managers?
...how long would It take to train competent 
hourly employees?
...how difficult would it ve to communicate fob 
requirements to unit level managers?
...how difficult would It be to include all of the 






































...how difficult would it be to use this 
company's kitchen equipment for another food 
service format?
Not Difficult 
1 2 Very Difficult 5 6 7
...how difficult would it be to use this 






...how difficult would it be to convert an 
average unit's building and grounds into 
another type of business?




Not Customized1 2 3
Very Difficult 
5 8 7
Very Customized5 6 7
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Is there anything else that you think I should 
know about the expert panel or about the firms that 
you were asked to rate? If so, please use this 
space for that purpose.
Your contribution to this effort is very greatly 
appreciated. If you would like a summary of my 
results, please print your name and address on the 
back of the return envelope. I will see that you 
receive it.
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